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Abstract 
A century has passed since the first call for a British national minimum wage (NMW).  
That remarkable Fabian tract discussed wage setting, coverage, monopsony, 
international labour standards, inspection and compliance and the interaction between 
the NMW and the social security system.  The NMW was finally introduced in 1999.  
It has raised the real and relative pay of low wage workers, narrowed the gender pay 
gap and now covers around 1-worker-in-10.  The consequences for employment have 
been extensively analysed using information on individuals, areas and firms.  There is 
little or no evidence of any employment effects.  The reasons for this include: an 
impact on hours rather than workers; employer wage setting and labour market 
frictions; offsets via the tax credit system; incomplete compliance; improvements in 
productivity; an increase in the relative price of minimum wage-produced consumer 
services; and a reduction in the relative profits of firms employing low paid workers. 
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“The effects of the minimum wage on employment and the distribution of 
income have been hotly debated policy question for over 50 years” (Brown 
1999, p.2102). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
British workers were covered for the first time ever by a national minimum wage (NMW) 
for the last nine months of the twentieth century.  In order to recommend the rate of 
NMW the Low Pay Commission (LPC) was established in 1997.  The LPC is a form of 
social partnership with three employer representatives, three worker representatives and 
three independent members (Brown 2002, 2006).  Its recommendations have always been 
unanimous and the government has always implemented the proposed NMW.  Since its 
introduction in April 1999 the NMW has been uprated on seven occasions. 
 
Two issues dominate any evaluation of the impact of the NMW.  First, what has it done 
to pay?  The dimensions of pay include money and real wage levels, wage inflation, pay 
differentials and wage inequality.  Second, what has it done to employment?  This paper 
sets out the evidence on these two subjects.  The core of the paper is the explanation for 
the apparent lack of an impact on employment.  Twelve possible explanations are 
examined.  Interestingly, many of these were put forward a century ago. 
 
It is a good time to undertake such an evaluation.  Last year marked the centenary of the 
first thoroughly-argued call for a national minimum wage (Sanders 1906) in a short 
Fabian Society tract which anticipated almost all the current debates.  It is salutary to 
realise how prescient the author and how controversial the issue.  Next, the LPC is on 
record that: “Our aim is to have a minimum wage that helps as many low-paid workers as 
possible without any significant adverse impacts on inflation or employment” (LPC 
2005).  The last four upratings have been above the growth in the average earnings index 
so it is important to determine whether or not the stated purpose of the LPC has been 
achieved.  Finally, the composition of the LPC will alter hugely in 2007 when six 
members leave, four of whom will have served all ten years since its establishment.  
Inevitably, this will lead to some changes in process and, probably, outcomes. 
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 demonstrates that the NMW has 
affected pay, a precondition for also analysing its impact on employment.  Sections 3 and 
4 cover the theoretical predictions concerning employment, methods of investigation and 
evidence.  It is shown in section 4 that employment effects appear small or non-existent; 
therefore section 5 presents an array of explanations for this finding.  The current debate 
on the NMW is put in historical context in section 6 by examining the insights of those 
calling for a NMW one hundred years ago.  Summary and conclusions are given in 
section 7.  The interaction between the NMW and the distribution of household income is 
set out in the appendix. 
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2. Impact on Pay 
 
The purpose of the NMW is to raise the pay of low-wage workers above what it 
otherwise would be.  Therefore the first task is to set out just what the NMW has done to 
pay.  If it has had no effect it cannot be held to influence employment.  Our focus is on 
the adult NMW.  Details concerning the lower youth rate for those aged 18-21 are set out 
in successive Low Pay Commission Reports (LPC 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007). 
 
In April 1999 the inaugural NMW was £3.60.  This rate covered some 1.2 million adult 
jobs i.e. 1.2 million jobs had to have their pay increased to comply with the NMW.1  The 
average pay increase, April 1998 to April 1999, for workers in the bottom decile of the 
earnings distribution was around 10% or double the growth in median earnings over the 
same period (LPC 2000 figure 3.6).  This improvement in relative pay was greater for 
part-time workers than full-timers (LPC 2001 table 3.2).  Table 1 shows median hourly 
earnings in October 1998 and 1999 for those aged 22 plus who remained in the same job.  
Those earning less than £3.60 in 1998 saw a boost of 15.5% between 1998 and 1999, 
compared with a 4.6% hike for those earning above the minimum wage. 
 
If we focus on a particularly low paid sector, care homes, between one third and two 
fifths of workers were previously paid below the NMW with a wage gap of 4% (the wage 
gap is the pay increase required to bring all employees up to the NMW as a percentage of 
the relevant wage bill).  This suggests an average wage increase of over 10% for such 
workers consequent on the introduction of the NMW (see Dickens and Manning 2004, 
Machin and Wilson 2004).  It is clear from both aggregate labour market data and from 
information for specific low paying sectors that the introduction of the NMW had a 
substantial impact on the earnings of those towards the bottom of the pay distribution in 
both absolute and relative terms. 
 
Subsequent upratings of the NMW, and their impact on pay relativities, are set out in 
table 2.  The NMW initially fell as a percentage of median hourly earnings from 47.6% in 
1999 to 45.2% in 2001.  Since then the NMW has been ratcheted up relative to the 
median, such that in 2007 it is around 52% of median pay. 
 
Another way of looking at this is to compare the growth in the NMW with movements in 
earnings and prices (see table 3 and figure 1).  In October 2006 the NMW is £5.35.  If the 
initial rate of £3.60 had instead been indexed to earnings the October 2006 rate would be 
                                                 
1 The coverage was in fact lower than the LPC initially anticipated (LPC 1998).  This was the result of 
serious deficiencies in the data provided to the LPC by the Office for National Statistics (Metcalf 2003).  
These deficiencies have subsequently been rectified (see e.g. Ormerod 2006). 
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£4.88.  And if it had been indexed to prices the corresponding NMW would have been 
between £4.02 and £4.34 depending on the price index used.  Thus the NMW has 
increased substantially faster than both average earnings and prices, especially since 2002. 
 
Increases in hourly earnings by percentile of the hourly earnings distribution are set out in 
figure 2.  The data describe the increase in earnings minus the increase in median 
earnings by percentile.  Between 1992 and 1997 when there were no wage floors, the 
earnings growth for those in the bottom quartile of the distribution was lower than the 
growth in median earnings.  But in the subsequent eight-year period 1998–2006, covering 
the introduction and upratings of the NMW, the situation was completely reversed. 
 
Between 1998 and 2006 the gender pay gap fell by over 5 percentage points (see table 2).  
For example, using median earnings the gender pay gap was 16.4% in 1998 and fell to 
10.8% by 2006.  It is plausible that the NMW made a significant contribution to this 
compression of the pay gap.  Figure 3 plots the gap by percentile.  The pay wedge 
between men and women narrowed much more at the bottom of the distribution than in 
the middle or top percentiles.  As an aside, figure 3 suggests that those who aspire to 
narrow the gender pay gap still further should focus on the top half of the pay distribution 
rather than the bottom half. 
 
What are the consequences of these movements in earnings for wage inequality?  
Dickens and Manning (2006) show, using both LFS and NES data, that wage inequality, 
measured by D50/D10, has fallen since 1998.  They state (2004a, b) that the introduction 
and early upratings of the NMW had a modest effect on wage inequality, but after 2002 
the effect became more pronounced.  For example, they calculate that, because of the 
NMW, in 2005 the average log hourly wage was 2.7% higher than it otherwise would 
have been (a direct effect of 1.8% plus a spillover effect of 0.9%).  Assuming that this 
effect is concentrated in the bottom quartile of the pay distribution (i.e. those above the 
lower quartile did not benefit from the NMW) the aggregate impact on the wage bill of 
the bottom quartile is 10.8%.  Dickens and Manning state that the underlying wage 
distribution (i.e. except for the effect of the NMW) is unchanged since 1998.  Therefore 
they attribute all the reduction in wage inequality since 1998 to the NMW.   
 
This tempering of pay inequality is substantial.  Wage inequality rose relentlessly from 
1978 to 1996.  The diminution in this inequality from 1997 to 2005 caused the 50/10 
wage ratio in 2005 to be the same as it was in 1989, reversing around half the growth of 
the inequality which occurred between 1978 and 1996.  And this occurred in the face of a 
huge, rapid alteration in the labour market working in the opposite direction (Dustmann 
et al. 2007).  Immigrant workers as a percentage of native workers rose from 8.7% in 
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1999 to 11.5% in 2005.  Each percentage point increase in this immigrant fraction is 
associated with a corresponding percentage point increase in the D50/D10 differential 
which would therefore, cet par, have risen by 3 percentage points 1999-2005.2  Thus the 
NMW “performs an important role to secure wages of workers who otherwise would lose 
out from immigration” (p.45). 
 
Fitzner (2006), a government economist, also confirms that “the minimum wage has not 
only significantly reduced the incidence of low pay, it has also helped contain wage 
inequality” (p.14).  Likewise Lam et al. (2006), who work for ONS, write “the NMW 
does appear to be reducing inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution”.  This latter 
study concentrates on workers who remain in the same job in their firm and are paid at 
the NMW or up to £2 an hour above it, some 20,000 workers a year in ASHE.  It finds 
that pay differentials remain broadly constant in cash terms when the NMW is uprated 
which implies a larger percentage rise in earnings for those at the NMW, hence the 
tempering of wage inequality. 
 
The evidence reviewed in this section suggests: first, the introduction of the NMW raised 
the absolute and relative pay of those at the bottom of the distribution; second, 
subsequent upratings have boosted the NMW significantly more than the growth in the 
AEI, especially since 2002.  The impact of the introduction of and upratings in the NMW 
on the number of workers covered is described in figure 4.  We take the 1998 earnings 
distribution – the last year before the NMW and the year with the least state intervention 
in pay setting in the private sector in the whole twentieth century.  The £3.60 rate covered 
5.5% of jobs (1.172m).  The October 2006 rate of £5.35 downrated to April 1999 by the 
AEI is £3.96.  This covers 9.7% of jobs (2.097m).3  Patently, the NMW has had a 
profound impact on the pay distribution.  This is a precondition for analysing its effect on 
employment, to which we now turn. 
                                                 
2 Dickens and Manning (2006) calculate, using both NES and LFS data, that the 50-10 differential fell 
around five percentage points 1999-2005.  They attribute this to the NMW.  Thus the true effect of the 
NMW is this 5 points plus the 3 point impact in the opposite direction as a consequence of immigration. 
3 It is not straightforward to calculate the number of workers “covered” by the NMW (see e.g. LPC 2006 
chapter 2) i.e. the number who receive a wage rise because they are below the new NMW.  My preferred 
method is to use the 1998 (pre-NMW) distribution and superimpose the NMW (suitably down rated) on 
that distribution. This method is likely to be problematic the further away we are from 1998 and if the 
underlying distribution of wages altered in the intervening period. Dickens and Manning (2006) state that 
the underlying distribution of wages did not alter between 1998 and 2005. Therefore use of the 1998 
distribution to estimate coverage is entirely correct. This method has the further advantage that using just 
one pay distribution (1998) means that comparisons of coverage from one year to the next are not confused 
by the alterations in data caused as ONS sought to improve their initially defective data. 
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3. Employment: Theory and Methods of Investigation 
 
“The most outrageous of these predictions are the attempts to show that, as 
wages are increased up to the minimum level, there will be an increase (or 
at least no decrease) in the number of jobs on offer at the higher wage.  Now, 
this seems to be obvious nonsense” (Walters 1998). 
 
Our focus is the impact of a minimum wage on employment.  We also briefly discuss the 
theory concerning hours of work and double-job holding.  This theory section draws 
freely on Borjas (2000), Brown (1999) and Stewart and Swaffield (2004). 
 
a. Standard economic model 
 
The standard economic model relates to the demand side of the labour market (see e.g. 
Stigler 1946, Hamermesh 1993).  If the minimum wage is set above the competitive wage 
employment falls back.  The extent of this reduction depends on (i) by how much the 
minimum wage exceeds the competitive wage; and (ii) the elasticity of demand for labour.  
Marshall’s (1901 pp.361, 362) famous rules of derived demand describe the factors that 
influence labour demand in a particular industry.  Labour demand will be more elastic: 
the greater the elasticity of substitution e.g. of capital for labour; the greater the elasticity 
of demand for the output; the larger is labour’s share in total costs4; the greater the supply 
elasticity of other factors of production such as capital.  In the standard model the 
unemployment effect of a minimum wage is larger than the employment effect because (i) 
some previously employed workers lose their jobs (the employment effect); (ii) some 
workers who did not find it worthwhile to work at the competitive wage now wish to 
work at the minimum wage but cannot find a job.  The unemployment effect – (i) plus (ii) 
– is larger the higher the minimum wage and the more elastic the labour supply and 
demand curves. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Strictly Marshall’s third rule only holds when the elasticity of product demand exceeds the elasticity of 
substitution. This is because the labour input can be sub-divided into ever smaller categories thus arbitrarily 
reducing labour costs in total costs for that category. As the labour input is redefined into ever smaller 
groups the elasticity of substitution among the smaller groups rises. The third rule therefore holds only 
when the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently small (i.e. the various labour inputs used by the firm are 
not essentially the same input broken up into arbitrary categories). This qualification was originally set out 
by Hicks (1932) appendix iii; for a simplified discussion see Borjas (2000 p.132). 
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b. Extensions or alternatives to the standard model 
 
Coverage and compliance 
 
The standard model assumes all workers are covered by the minimum wage and all firms 
comply with the minimum wage.  In the UK the previous system of minimum wage 
protection (abolished in 1993) via the Wages Councils (see Metcalf 1981) did not cover 
all workers or even many low paid sectors like care homes and business services such as 
cleaning and security.  But the NMW, introduced in 1999, provides near universal 
coverage (see section 5).  This is an important consideration because any adverse 
employment effects of a minimum wage are likely to be tempered by less-than-universal 
coverage.  As Brown (1999) puts it: “the uncovered sector may dilute but not eliminate 
the negative effects of the minimum wage on employment” (p.2104).  The argument is, 
essentially, that any workers displaced by a minimum wage in the covered sector can 
migrate to the uncovered sector to find work, driving down the wage in the uncovered 
sector in the process. 
 
Non-compliance is, de facto, equivalent to having an uncovered sector: workers are 
employed at a lower wage in the non-complying sector.  Borjas suggests that in the US 
two fifths of workers who qualify for the minimum wage were paid less than that around 
year 2000.  The empirical evidence concerning non-compliance in the UK is set out in 
section 5.  Suffice it to say here that, while non-compliance is almost certainly growing, it 
is surprising that so many firms do observe the NMW.  Compliance partly depends on: (i) 
the probability of being caught if you do not comply; (ii) the penalties suffered when you 
are so caught.  In the UK both the likelihood of being caught and any consequent penalty 
are trivial.   
 
Heterogeneous labour 
 
The standard theory initially assumes homogenous labour but quickly recognises that 
workers are not perfect substitutes for one another: “Thus, it makes sense to focus on the 
analysis of low wage groups, where the proportion directly affected is larger and so the 
anticipated effect on group employment is likely to be larger” (Brown 1999, p.2107).  
Because workers are heterogeneous wage structures and differentials matter and the firm 
may, for example, substitute more skilled labour for less skilled labour in the face of an 
increase in the minimum wage.  Essentially Brown is cautioning against trying to analyse 
the employment effects of the MW by using time series data on aggregate employment 
because the NMW only affects a small share of total employment and is therefore “likely 
to be small and in any case swamped by other factors”.  Instead the focus should be on 
 7
low paid individuals and low paying sectors.  This is precisely the core of British 
empirical work discussed below. 
 
Monopsony: traditional version 
 
Brown (1999, p.2108) states “Although they are not, in the end, intended to believe it, 
undergraduate students are exposed to the possibility that a “skilfully set” minimum wage 
increases employment under monopsony”.  This possibility was first noted by Stigler 
(1946).  The key point is that the monopsonist faces an upward sloping labour supply 
curve.  The profit maximising equilibrium is where the marginal cost of labour equals the 
marginal revenue product (demand for labour curve).  This yields wage and employment 
levels below their competitive counterparts.  As long as the minimum wage is set 
between the monopsonistic and competitive wage both employment and pay will increase.  
The minimum wage acts as a floor and prevents a profit-maximising monopsonist 
reducing the quantity of labour employed and cutting the wage as much as it would like 
to. 
 
How much the wage can be raised under monopsony before employment starts to fall 
again therefore depends on the elasticity of labour supply.  The more inelastic the labour 
supply the greater the scope for raising the wage.  Standard analysis uses a one-company 
town, perhaps a mining company.  Frankly, this does not describe the market for low paid 
jobs in the UK (see LPC 2005).  The main low-paying sectors include retail, hospitality, 
cleaning, security, hairdressing and agriculture all of which have many employers so that 
the elasticity of labour supply to any one employer should be close to infinite, and the 
opening for a skilfully set minimum wage negligible.  Further the competitive wage 
varies among employers while the minimum wage is uniform, which makes it less likely 
that most employers affected by the NMW will be in the employment-enhancing range. 
 
Monopsony: modern 
 
Although the notion of monopsony described by a company town is at odds with the 
operation of the low paid labour market there are other reasons why the labour supply 
curve facing firms which employ low paid workers may be upward sloping.  Bhaskar et 
al. (2002) and Manning (2003) describe such a situation as an oligopsony or 
monopsonistic competition in the labour market such that a degree of labour market 
power co-exists with competition among employers.  There are three main sources of 
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such market power, frictions,5 resulting in a less than perfectly elastic labour supply 
curve.  First, the absence of perfect information on possible alternative jobs.  If workers 
must search for new jobs, a cut in pay will not result immediately in all workers quitting.  
Marshall (1901) knew this perfectly well: “it would be altogether unreasonable to make 
this assumption [perfect knowledge] when we are examining the causes that govern the 
supply of labour in any of the lower grades of industry.  For if a man had sufficient 
ability to know everything about the market for his labour, he would have too much to 
remain long in a low grade” (p.256).  Second, the costs of moving between employers.  
Third, workers having heterogeneous preferences for different jobs.  Although a worker 
might have identical productivity in two different jobs s/he prefers the type of work – job 
specification – or working conditions – e.g. hours, distance from home to work, social 
environment at the workplace – in one job over another.  Jobs which match the needs of 
child care for a mother with nursery/primary school-age children might be a typical 
example of such a preference.  Or a teenager might prefer a Saturday job at Marks & 
Spencer because her friends also work there.  The key point is that a worker in a preferred 
job may not immediately choose to leave an employer that slightly reduces its wage rate. 
 
In an oligopsonistic labour market, where multiple employers compete with one another 
for workers, a minimum wage has two conflicting effects.  First, a minimum wage set 
moderately above the market wage will cause establishment-level employment to 
increase because, if all employers offer higher pay (to comply with the minimum wage), 
the labour market participation rate also rises: “Intuitively, by setting the minimum wage 
above the market wage employers find it easier to fill their vacancies” (Bhaskar et al. 
2002, p.168).  Second, a binding minimum wage decreases employers’ profits, and with 
free entry into and exit from the labour market some employers will be forced to go out 
of business and exit.  The jobs in such firms are lost.  Thus, minimum wages have two 
opposing effects: “the employment-increasing “oligopsony” effect and the employment-
reducing “exit” effect.  The overall effect of a minimum wage depends on which effect 
dominates” (Bhaskar et al. 2002 p.169).  The general conclusion is that a minimum wage 
set moderately above the market wage “may have a positive effect or negative effect on 
employment, but the size of this effect will generally be small because of the two 
countervailing forces” (p.169). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Matching models (see Mortensen and Pissarides 1999) also start from the premise that important frictions 
exist in labour markets. But they differ from monopsony models in the assumptions made about wage 
determination (see Manning 2003, section 1.3 for full details). 
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Efficiency wages 
 
Effort need not be constant and this has (different) implications for employment.  Brown 
(1999 p.2110) suggests that if employers respond to the minimum wage “by raising the 
effort standard they require on the job, employment effects may be magnified rather than 
mitigated”.  If a 10% increase in the minimum wage is offset by a 10% increase in 
enforced effort, employment in efficiency units is not changed but employment of 
workers or hours worked would be cut by 10%.  Manning (1995) presents an alternative 
model in which the marginal revenue product of labour shifts outwards as a consequence 
of the extra effort, thus accommodating the higher wage thereby leaving employment 
constant or even higher.  This is simply a modern version of the old “economy of high 
wages” argument (Pigou 1920) where higher wages permit better nutrition and hence 
higher productivity in jobs requiring physical strength.  So, again, we have two different 
possible employment effects under the efficiency wage arguments, which confirms that 
economic theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction concerning the 
employment impact of the NMW. 
 
Offsets 
 
Pay is the most important part of the cost of low paid labour but often not the only 
component.  Just as legislated improvements in the non-wage aspects of the job – for 
example health insurance, safety or employer provided training – may lead to lower 
wages, so the employer may offset some of the cost of a minimum wage by cuts 
elsewhere.  This will limit the employment loss. 
 
Summary 
 
In the standard text book model a MW reduces employment, although any such reduction 
will tend to be attenuated by lower coverage or compliance and various available offsets.  
But traditional monopsony models and modern versions such as oligopsony suggest 
employment might rise with a minimum wage.  The key feature of both traditional and 
modern monopsony models is the emphasis on the supply side of the labour market i.e. 
vacancies previously unfilled now get filled because some workers who would not work 
at the previous wage will do at the minimum wage.  Therefore as Manning (2003) 
observes “the impact of minimum wages on employment should primarily be an 
empirical issue”. 
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c. Hours of work and double-job holding 
 
The standard textbook model suggests that employment will tend to fall when the 
minimum wage is set above the competitive wage.  Such a reduction can be achieved 
along either or both the extensive margin – workers – or intensive margin – hours.  
Hamermesh (1993 p.294) states that in the short run “employers are quicker to alter hours 
in response to shocks than they are to change levels of employment”.  There are a number 
of reasons why we might expect firms with a high proportion of low paid workers to cut 
hours.  For example if fixed costs per worker are high the employer will tend to cut the 
number of workers and lengthen the workweek for those that remain.  In the event, the 
fixed costs of low paid workers are relatively low: they are low skilled, have little on-the-
job training and high labour turnover.  So hours are more likely to fall than rise.  Next 
consider the technology employed by minimum wage-type firms.  Hospitality, retail, care 
homes, cleaning etc all tend to have lower capital : labour ratios than the average UK 
firm.  Further, the possibility of substituting capital for labour is limited.  And there is 
already a high incidence of part-time work.  Each of these technology parameters points 
to a cut in hours rather than an increase.  Further, UK labour law - rules concerning 
redundancy and unfair dismissal for example – constrains firms which desire to adjust 
employment downwards (OECD 2006).  Therefore any initial adjustment may come 
along the intensive rather than extensive margin. 
 
One counter argument points to longer hours.  Full-time workers are paid (per hour) more 
than equivalent part-time employees.  This implies that full-time workers are more 
productive.  If so, firms might be expected to lengthen the work week in response to a 
minimum wage rather than reducing hours. 
 
Second-job holding provides, in principle, a focus on adjustment in labour supply.  
Presumably workers normally take second jobs because the income generated by the 
hours/wage combination in the first job is insufficient.  So the imposition of a minimum 
wage will tend to reduce the supply of individuals willing to take second jobs (Robinson 
and Wadsworth 2005).  In the presence of hours constraints, the effect of a minimum 
wage is to raise the offered wage closer to the desired wage, with the hours constrained in 
the first job restricting the substitution effect so that the income effect dominates.  This 
could reduce the incidence of second jobs among low paid workers relative to others. 
 
d. Methods of investigation 
 
Associations between the introduction and uprating of the NMW and employment have 
been investigated using a number of different methods including analysis of: aggregate 
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employment and the shares of employment by sector or age; individual employment 
probabilities; variations in changes in employment across geographic areas; and detailed 
case studies and surveys across firms in sectors like care homes which have a high 
incidence of low paid workers. 
 
Aggregate employment and shares by sector and age 
 
A useful initial overview of the impact of the NMW details aggregate employment and 
unemployment before and after the introduction or uprating of the NMW.  The graph can 
be plotted to examine any sharp movements in this aggregate data around the time of the 
introduction or upratings.  A slightly more sophisticated extension concerns sector or age 
employment shares.  Time series evidence on the share of employment of low paying 
sectors – including retail, hospitality, cleaning and security, textiles, social care, 
hairdressing and agriculture – can be studied to see if there are any noticeable alterations 
in such shares associated with the NMW.  Such graphs – while remarkably useful – only 
get you so far.  They do not show what would have happened to aggregate employment 
or sector shares but for the NMW.  For example, even if the share of employment in the 
hospitality sector remains constant we cannot conclude the NMW had no impact: perhaps 
its share would have risen but for the NMW.   
 
Individuals: difference-in-difference 
 
Individual-level longitudinal data from a number of sources has been used to estimate the 
impact of the introduction, and subsequent uprating, of the NMW on the probability of 
remaining in employment and on hours worked.  Stewart (2002) notes that the idea at the 
core of this method “is an intuitively obvious one: other things being equal, the largest 
effect of the introduction (or uprating) of the minimum wage on employment will be 
found where it has its largest effect on wages” (p.584).  The method compares low wage 
workers whose pay would have to be raised to comply with the NMW with a similar 
group of workers not directly affected.  The individual’s employment to unemployment 
transition probability is estimated as a function of the individual’s initial position in the 
wage distribution. 
 
This approach is known as “quasi-experimental” and uses the difference-in-difference 
technique.  The first difference is between the two groups – the treatment group whose 
wage was raised to comply with the NMW and the control group of similar workers 
whose wage was just above the NMW.  The second difference is the change in individual 
employment probabilities before and after the introduction or uprating of the NMW.  
Thus the difference between the two groups in a period affected by the NMW can be 
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contrasted with the corresponding difference in an earlier period when no NMW was in 
place.  Stewart (2004a) summarises the approach: “The question addressed is whether an 
individual whose wage would have to be increased to comply with the new minimum has 
a higher probability of losing their job than a comparable person in the wage group just 
above the new NMW”.  Three longitudinal data sources have been used in these analyses 
of individual workers – Labour Force Survey (LFS), British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) and New Earnings Survey (NES) now retitled the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE).  The pros and cons of each source are fully set out in Stewart (2004a). 
 
Results concerning the impact of the NMW using the difference-in-difference technique 
will be contaminated if: (i) compliance with the NMW is seriously incomplete; (ii) the 
NMW has wage spillover effects further up the pay distribution.  There is a suggestion of 
growing non-compliance, particularly among firms employing immigrants (see section 5).  
But this is unlikely to debase the evidence in section 4 because such workers mostly do 
not appear in the LFS, BHPS or NES.  Similarly, there is no strong evidence of wage 
spillovers further up the earnings distribution either when the NMW was introduced in 
1999 or uprated 2000-02 (see e.g. LPC 2000, 2001; Dickens and Manning 2004a, 2004b; 
Dickens and Draca 2005).  But there is evidence of such spillovers from the 2003 
uprating onwards (see e.g. Butcher 2005 and Dickens and Manning 2006).  Therefore the 
extant evidence (tables 5 and 6) covering 1999-2002 is probably free of contamination. 
But any difference-in-difference studies of the upratings from 2003 onwards may well be 
degraded by these wage spillovers.  This is a nuisance because, during 2003-06, the 
NMW was increased by more than the growth in the AEI on four occasions – the very 
period when analysis of the employment effects is vital for any evaluation of the impact 
of the NMW.  It should be noted that if employment effects are found in the face of such 
spillovers this is a strong result – the spillovers reduce the chance of finding an 
employment effect. 
 
The difference-in-difference technique can be adapted to distinguish between workers 
whose wage needed to be raised a lot and those for whom only a small increase was 
required.  This method is called the wage-gap.  It has the advantage that it permits the 
elasticity of employment with respect to the wage to be calculated. 
 
Employment changes by geographic area 
 
There is considerable variation in pay across geographic areas in the UK.  Therefore the 
introduction of the national MW affected the wage distribution much more in some areas 
than in others.  In Northumberland and Lincolnshire a much higher fraction of employees 
needed their wage to rise to comply with the NMW than in Surrey or Berkshire.  Card 
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(1992) notes that: “from an evaluation perspective, a uniform minimum wage is an 
underappreciated asset”.  Stewart has exploited this uniform MW coupled with 
geographic wage variation: “On the basis of the standard textbook model of the labour 
market, we would expect to see a relative decline in employment in low-wage areas 
where the minimum bit more deeply compared to higher wage areas where relatively few 
employees’ wages were affected” (2002, p.584). 
 
There are two types of estimate.  First, a regression relationship between the change in 
the employment rate for the period just before and just after the introduction of the NMW 
and the fraction of workers in an area initially below the minimum wage.  Second, the 
difference-in-difference estimator based on comparing groups of low-wage and high-
wage areas of the country.  These two estimators can be calculated for both data 
aggregated to the area level and individual-level data. 
 
Employment changes across firms 
 
Employment change across workplaces and firms has been studied both by industrial 
relations scholars and economists.  The nationally representative 1998 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) collected information for some 2000 workplaces 
on the proportion of the workforce earning below £3.50.  The 1998-2004 panel can be 
used to calculate the subsequent employment change to examine whether or not 
employment grew/fell relatively in those workplaces with a high initial fraction of low 
paid individuals. 
 
The most detailed sector study is of care homes.  Data was collected for over 600 homes 
before and after the introduction of the NMW with a smaller sample studied for a 
subsequent uprating.  The impact of the NMW on three employment variables was 
analysed: the probability of the home closing; the change in employment; and the change 
in hours.  The wage variables were the percentage of employees in the home initially 
below the NMW and the wage gap – the fraction of the wage bill of the home required to 
bring workers up to the NMW.  A cross section regression of employment on pay, with 
controls, provided the evidence on the sensitivity of employment. 
 
Industrial relations research is different in that typically a few firms or organisations are 
studied intensively.  The focus is often on whether firms take a strategic view of how to 
cope with the NMW or a reactive, muddling-through, approach (e.g. Adam-Smith et al. 
2003).  A strategic approach includes deliberate cost minimisation via intensification of 
work.  Alternatively the firm may move up-market by investing in training and upgrading 
the skill content of jobs to produce higher value added goods and services.  The reactive 
 14
policy accommodates the NMW because wages are set “within a range of indeterminacy” 
and informality and managerial prerogative are the order of the day in many low paying 
firms.   
 
 
4. Employment: Evidence6 
 
a. Aggregate employment and sector and age shares 
 
Aggregate UK employment has risen consistently since 1993 and, similarly, aggregate 
unemployment fell during that time up to mid-2005.  There is no evidence that the 
introduction of the NMW influenced these trends in aggregate employment and 
unemployment. 
 
But the NMW obviously affects low paying sectors more than other sectors.  Therefore 
table 4 sets out details of employment in GB as a whole and in eight low paying sectors: 
retail; hospitality; social care; cleaning; agriculture; security; textiles, clothing and 
footwear; and hairdressing.  The data refer to employee jobs and are collected from 
employers’ records.  Between March 1999, just prior to the introduction of the NMW, 
and March 2006 total employment in these eight sectors rose from 6.3m to 6.7m and their 
share of total employment remained virtually unchanged at near 26%.  The only really 
noticeable change in any employment share occurred in textiles, clothing and footwear 
reflecting, not the NMW, but the long term decline of this sector going back decades.  At 
the time the NMW was introduced there was no MW for 16-17 year olds, but 18-21 year 
olds were covered (at a rate with a stronger bite than the adult rate).  Therefore, in theory, 
we might expect some substitution between the two groups.  In the event between spring 
1999 and spring 2000 the employment share of 16-17 year olds fell, while that of 18-21 
year olds increased.   
 
This evidence on aggregate employment, sector shares and age shares does not suggest 
any NMW effect because aggregate employment continued to grow and the sector shares 
remained similar.  But such information does not indicate what would have happened to 
employment but for the NMW so we now examine employment changes across 
individuals, areas and firms which does provide such evidence. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The focus is the employment effects of the national minimum wage.  Evidence on the corresponding 
employment effects of the Wages Councils is fully set out in Fernie and Metcalf (1996) and LPC (1998, 
appendix 11). 
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b. Individuals 
 
Introduction of NMW 
 
Evidence on the employment effects of the introduction of the NMW in 1999 is set out in 
table 5.  The most thorough study is Stewart (2004a) which uses: all three data sources; 
both difference-in-difference and wage gap models; various measures of the wage; an 
array of variables to control for differences in employment probabilities caused by factors 
other than the NMW; and many alternative variable definitions, samples etc.  Stewart’s 
summary is unambiguous: “The estimated impact of the introduction of the minimum 
wage on the probability of remaining in employment is insignificantly different from zero 
for all four demographic groups (male, female adults and youths) and all three datasets” 
(p.96).  The implied elasticities of employment with respect to the wage are tiny, all non-
significant, and mostly positive.  Stewart concludes that the evidence indicates: “no 
significant adverse employment effects of the introduction of the UK minimum wage in 
any of the four demographic groups considered or in any of the three datasets examined” 
(p.96). 
 
Total employment consists of the number of employees multiplied by hours of work.  
Employment can be adjusted along the extensive margin – the number of employees – or 
the intensive margin – hours worked per employee.  The evidence above suggest no 
adjustments occurred consequent on the introduction of the NMW along the extensive 
margin.  What of adjustments in hours – the intensive margin? 
 
Stewart and Swaffield (2002) analysed the hours of over 4500 workers aged 18-60/65 
from the 1999 BHPS.  Their focus was the group (4.6%) whose pay was increased to 
bring them up to the NMW.  The vast majority of these workers did not have their basic 
hours changed but around 1-in-10 reported that their hours were reduced as a direct 
consequence of the NMW.  The authors conclude that “employees who had their pay 
increased due to the NMW have a higher probability [than workers whose pay was 
unaffected] of having reductions in their basic hours as a direct result of the introduction 
of the NMW”.  This conclusion is reinforced in their 2004 study which uses the 
difference-in-difference method and many observations on individuals from both NES 
and LFS to analyse changes in hours.  They study adjustments in both basic and total 
hours.  For those initially paid below the NMW compared with the control group they 
report, essentially, that the NMW led to a cut in hours, both basic and total, of between 1-
2 per week.  LFS data suggest that the impact was higher for men than for women.  They 
conclude that the NMW “led to a reduction in paid working hours of both male and 
female low wage workers”. 
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Connolly and Gregory (2002) analyse the consequences of the introduction of the NMW 
for average weekly hours worked by women aged 22-59.  Women, especially those 
working part-time, were the main beneficiaries of the NMW (LPC 1999, 2000).  In 
contrast to Stewart and Swaffield (2004) they: “find no evidence that hours worked 
amongst sub-minimum wage workers have changed significantly differently from those 
in the comparator group whose pay was unaffected; even where the change appears 
negatively signed it is not significant” (p.629).  However, it should be noted that when 
they take a 3-year period after the introduction of the NMW the negative effect of the 
NMW on hours of the treatment group is larger than it is after just 1 year, albeit still not 
statistically significant.  This suggests, consistent with Stewart and Swaffield, that any 
adjustment in hours – consequent on the NMW – takes some time to be implemented.  
But the further away we get from the introduction of the NMW, the more difficult it is to 
track any effects of its introduction because there are so many other intervening factors. 
 
Around 4% of employees have second jobs.  The incidence of second job holding is 
higher the lower the hourly wage in the main job.  Robinson and Wadsworth (2005) 
analyse whether the introduction of the NMW affected this incidence of second jobs.  
The authors draw on the results of Stewart (2004a) – no apparent employment affects of 
the NMW – to argue that the supply of jobs was not affected by the introduction of the 
NMW and, therefore, any change in the probability of second job holding represents a 
labour supply effect.  As shown in the theory section, the expectation is for a 
disproportionate lowering of the incidence of second job holding for those initially below 
the NMW.  In the event there was no significant effect on the change in the probability of 
second job holding for those initially below the NMW as compared with a control group 
a little above the NMW.  There was also no apparent impact on hours of work in either 
the second or main job. 
 
Uprating of NMW 
 
The employment effects on individuals of uprating the NMW are set out in table 6.  
Stewart (2004b) finds that for the 2000 and 2001 upratings : “the difference-in-difference 
estimates are insignificant for both upratings and all demographic groups. . . . . the 
majority are positive. . . . . No significant adverse effect is found for the upratings for any 
of the demographic groups considered” (pp c115, c116).  Dickens and Draca (2005) 
study the 2003 uprating.  Their analysis extends the Stewart study of the 2000 and 2001 
upratings in two ways.  First it uses actual, rather than derived, hourly pay (actual is not 
reported for the whole LFS sample).  Second evidence on inflows to employment (as well 
as the normal outflows) is set out.  Virtually all their results are not statistically 
significant.  They find a slight (ns) reduction in the employment retention probabilities 
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for the adult treatment group (from 93% to 91%) but no differences in job inflow rates.  
The study concludes that there is: “no clear statistically significant evidence of 
employment losses, measured either in terms of employment outflows or inflows”. 
 
ASHE data is used ingeniously by Jones et al. (2006).  They separate the ASHE sample, 
some 135000 workers, into the low paid – defined as at or below the NMW – and those 
not low paid.  They then calculate the annual transition matrix with three outcomes: not 
low paid, low paid, exit from the sample.  The matrices are presented for all 6 years 
1999-2000 to 2004-2005.  Exits from ASHE are presumably mainly into unemployment 
but also include job changes not yet traced by the survey, moved abroad, incapacity, 
retirement and death.  Such exits have risen monotonically for both the low paid and not 
low paid groups and are absolutely higher for the low paid than the higher paid group.  
But what is noticeable is that the increase in the exit rate is much lower for the low paid 
group than for the high paid.  This is the reverse of what would happen if the NMW had 
adverse employment effects. 
 
 
c. Geographic area variation in pay 
 
The wage distribution in areas with a relatively high fraction of workers (“high impact”) 
paid below the NMW was, not surprisingly, more affected than the corresponding 
distribution in higher wage areas (“low impact”).  Stewart (2002) uses this impact on pay 
by area to study its association with employment changes (see table 5).  Evidence is first 
set out for the period straddling the introduction of the NMW.  The unit of observation is 
140 areas.  The evidence is cross sectional and uses two methods of investigation: (a) the 
regression relationship between the change in employment and the fraction of workers 
initially below the NMW; (b) difference-in-difference employment rates between high 
impact and low impact areas.  The conclusion is stark: “there is no evidence of the 
introduction of the minimum wage reducing employment” (p.596).  Next, evidence is 
presented using panel data for the period before the introduction of the NMW (1996-98) 
and afterwards (1998-2000) using data on comparing individuals who work in high 
impact areas compared with low impact areas.  For the sample as a whole all estimates 
are non-significant.  More importantly when the sample is restricted to those most at risk 
– e.g. women, unskilled, those in their job for under 12 months, in low paying industries 
– “all estimates are insignificant and the great majority of them are positive” (p.602).  
Stewart concludes that his findings “are consistent with the view that the minimum 
wage’s introduction had no systematic adverse effect on employment” (p.603). 
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Employment creation or destruction across 459 Census areas was also studied by 
Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) for eight separate low paying sectors: cleaning, 
hairdressing, hospitality, retail, leisure, security, social services, and textiles over years 
1997-2001.  Their two employment indicators were net creation of establishments and 
aggregate employment.  Both these measures of employment increased in all sectors 
except textiles.  But in areas where the NMW bit harder – a relatively high initial fraction 
of workers below the NMW – the net growth in establishments or in employment was 
modestly below that in areas where the bite of the NMW was softer.  Thus it is possible 
that employment growth in these sector/area cells was a little lower than it would have 
been in the absence of the NMW.  It should be noted, however, that a parallel 
investigation by the authors using matched information from the NES and the Annual 
Business Inquiry concluded: “we fail to find evidence of a significant employment effect” 
(p.32). 
 
Retail and hospitality are the sectors with the largest absolute number of low paid 
workers.  Experian (2006) examined the association between the bite of the NMW by 
region and employment changes by region for these two sectors over the period 1995-
2004.  There was no association for retail.  For hospitality there was a significant 
negative association but the elasticity of employment wrt the wage is tiny – a doubling of 
the wage bill resulting in just a 4% drop in employment.  This small negative link was 
entirely driven by the substantial (7.5% pa) 2003 and 2004 upratings.  Experian also 
found a negative association between new VAT registrations and the bite of the NMW by 
region in distribution and hospitality, but again the NMW effect was very modest – a 
doubling of the wage bill leading to an approximate 1% reduction in new VAT 
registrations. 
 
d. Employment changes across firms 
 
Employment changes across firms have been analysed for the UK as a whole and for 
specific sectors like care homes, hospitality and clothing. 
 
The Workplace Employment Relations Survey is a representative sample of some 2000 
British workplaces (Kersley et al. 2004).  In 1998 – the year prior to the introduction of 
the NMW – it asked the percentage of employees in the workplace paid less than £3.50 
an hour (a neat anticipation of the £3.60 rate a year later!)  The panel of workplaces also 
in the next 2004 survey totals 1519, with 1126 in the private sector.  Table 7 cross 
tabulates the employment change between 1998 and 2004 against the percentage of the 
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1998 workforce paid below £3.507 (remember, no cross tabulation from WERS has ever 
been overturned by a regression analysis).  Compare the workplaces with a quarter or 
more of their workforce earning below £3.50 an hour in 1998 with the total sample.  The 
closure rate between 1998 and 2004 was virtually identical at 21%.  The low paying 
workplaces were less likely to experience a fall in employment above 25% than the 
sample as a whole, and they were more likely to boost their employment by above 25%.  
All in all there is no evidence of any NMW employment effects 1998-2004 in the WERS 
sample. 
 
The UK has a full representative private sector dataset called FAME – Financial Analysis 
Made Easy.  Draca et al. (2005) use this to analyse closure rates, profits and productivity 
among around 1000 firms which pay below the median wage.  They use a difference-in-
difference approach (average annual wage below £12000 or between £12000 and the 
median of £20000) but find no correlation between the introduction of the NMW and 
probability of closure.  Rather, they state that the profit margin fell by between 8 to 11% 
in firms affected by the NMW (see section 5). 
 
The care home sector is particularly interesting to study (see Dickens and Manning 2003, 
Machin et al. 2003 and Machin and Wilson 2004).  Their analyses covered some 600 care 
homes.  Just prior to the introduction of the NMW 32% of employees in the 
representative sample were paid below the NMW.  Just after its introduction 28% 
received exactly the NMW.  So the NMW had a huge impact on the pay distribution in 
this sector resulting in a sharp fall in wage dispersion.  The probability of closure was 
documented over a three and a half year period 1998-2001.  Overall 23% of homes closed 
(7% pa), not a high figure for a low wage, high turnover, small firm sector.  But there was 
no association between the probability of closure and either the fraction initially paid less 
than the NMW or the wage gap.  However, there is evidence that those firms affected by 
the NMW were likely to suffer relative employment falls: a 10% increase in the 
proportion initially paid below the NMW (say from 30% to 33%) was associated with 
1.3% lower employment growth.  And a 10% higher wage gap (say from 4% to 4.4%) 
was associated with 2.9% lower employment growth.  Machin and Wilson state that 
overall employment in the care home sector was growing at this time and what may have 
been happening was a reallocation of labour away from low wage homes towards those 
with higher pay.  However, it should be noted that there is also evidence of a negative 
affect on hours. 
 
                                                 
7 I am grateful to Mark Williams for producing this cross tabulation for me. 
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Dickens and Manning (2003) commenting on the introduction of the NMW in this sector 
state that it had a “small negative impact on employment”.  They point out that such a 
result is unlikely to be generalisable to other sectors.  Care homes had “the lowest wages 
in the UK and [it] is where the impact of the NMW has been largest.  Also, it is an 
unusual sector in that firms are restricted from passing higher costs onto higher prices 
since prices are largely set by local authorities [see e.g. the complaint of the Independent 
Health and Care Providers 2006].  Both of these factors mean that if we are going to find 
job losses anywhere we would expect them in this sector” (p.209).  Even so, when 
Machin and Wilson (2004) studied the 2001 uprating in the NMW for a sub-sample of 
180 care homes on the south coast (see table 6) they found no significant evidence of any 
employment effects associated with this uprating. 
 
Case studies of one or a few firms exist for most of the low paid sectors.  Examples 
include hospitality (Adam-Smith et al. 2003), textiles (Heyes and Gray 2001a), 
hairdressing (Drucker et al. 2005), apparel (Undy et al. 2001) and Asian home workers in 
the clothing industry (Heyes and Gray 2001b).  A survey of the findings concerning jobs 
from such case studies (Mason et al. 2006) “found no evidence of systematic adverse 
effects” (p.103).  This is consistent with the findings from the two major surveys of how 
firms in low paying sectors adjusted to the introduction (Grimshaw and Carroll 2002) and 
uprating (Cronin and Thewlis 2004) of the NMW.  The former reports for example “very 
little evidence of an adverse impact of the NMW on employment” (p.vii) and the latter 
could only find ten firms out of the 4000 initially surveyed which had reduced staffing 
levels because of the NMW or other changes to employment law. 
 
Almost all these case studies and surveys suggest management in small firms in these low 
paying sectors is reactive.  Consider the hospitality case which surveyed 20 small 
businesses in the Portsmouth area in 2000 including hotels, restaurants, public houses, 
clubs and contract caterers.  Before the NMW over a fifth of workers in these firms 
earned below the NMW and its introduction compressed the wage structure.  
Management simply used the inherent flexibility in the jobs and the lack of formality in 
employee-management relations to accommodate the NMW.  The authors conclude that 
the “prevailing pattern of employment relations [was] barely altered. . . . . The national 
minimum wage has not so much challenged existing practices in hospitality as reinforced 
them” (p.44).  It is interesting to note in passing that many studies report that staff 
shortages were usually eased by the introduction of the NMW, hinting at a monopsonistic 
labour market. 
 
Mason et al. surveyed over 17,000 small businesses to gauge their likely reaction to the 
2003 uprating (table 6).  They used a 5-point scale where 1 was a significant decrease in 
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employment and 5 was a significant increase in employment.  It can be seen that the 
mean responses are a tad below 3 (no change).  Any reduction in total employment was 
expected to come via hours rather than people (but remember these are likely, not actual, 
reactions to the higher NMW).  The authors state that there is no evidence of small 
business adopting “high-level competitive strategies based around capital investment and 
improved service quality. . . . the NMW has had a limited effect on the small business 
sector”. 
 
 
5. Reasons for small employment effects 
 
Evidence suggests that the employment effects of the NMW thus far have been small or 
non-existent.  This section offers twelve explanations for this finding.  We start with two 
explanations which can immediately be rejected: it is not the case that the NMW was set 
below extant wages or that coverage is incomplete.  We then consider five possible 
reasons: long run effects have not been captured; the impact of the relatively large hikes 
in the NMW 2003-06 have as yet been insufficiently studied; mobility among low paid 
workers means that for many the NMW is a stepping stone to a higher paid more secure 
job; incomplete compliance may moderate any employment effects; and one particular 
offset is sometimes unlawfully used to lower employers’ wage costs.  Then we turn to 
five probable explanations.  It is commonsense to suggest that productivity, prices and 
profits will be altered to help accommodate the NMW and the evidence confirms this.  
Next there is some evidence that employers alter weekly hours.  And finally labour 
market frictions – modern monopsony – imply that competitive theory provides an 
incomplete description of the low paid labour market. 
 
a. Rejected explanations 
 
Was NMW set below the competitive wage? 
 
For the NMW to impact on employment, the wage must be set above the competitive 
wage.  Was it, instead, set at or below the competitive wage?  The evidence in section 2 
is unambiguous.  The introduction and subsequent upratings of the NMW raised the 
absolute and relative pay of those towards the bottom of the distribution.  At its 
introduction the average growth in earnings 1998-1999 for those below the NMW was at 
least double the growth in median earnings.  At the time of its introduction the NMW was 
47.6% of median earnings.  The corresponding 2007 figure is around 52%.  As Butcher 
(2005) – a government economist – puts it: “. . . the increase in median hourly earnings 
for adults aged 22 and over was greater than the increase in hourly earnings for those in 
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the bottom half of the hourly earnings distribution in the period 1992 to 1997.  This 
contrasts starkly with the period that covers the introduction of the minimum wage.  
Between 1998 and 2003 hourly earnings at the lower end of the pay distribution grew 
faster than at the median” (p.430).  Clearly, the NMW has not been set at or below the 
competitive wage. 
 
Incomplete coverage 
 
Incomplete coverage of the minimum wage will tend to moderate any measured 
employment effects because the worker can switch to the uncovered sector to find a job.  
Thus, under our previous wages council system (abolished in 1993), an employee who 
lost her job in the covered retail or hospitality sector might move to the uncovered care 
home or cleaning sector.  By contrast coverage of the NMW is near universal.  The 
National Minimum Wage Act 1998 states that the minimum wage is payable to workers8 
working, or ordinarily working, in the UK under a contract of employment, and who have 
ceased to be of compulsory school age.  Coverage is not restricted to employees, but 
rather includes “special classes of person” such as homeworkers, agency workers and 
casual labourers.  DTI (2004) and Studd (2006) set out the non-covered workers: 
genuinely self-employed; company directors; those of compulsory school age; 
volunteers/voluntary workers; students doing work experience as part of a higher 
education course; people living and working within the family; religious and other 
communities; prisoners; members of the armed forces; share fishermen; some mariners.  
Although this is quite a long list of exceptions, leaving aside the self-employed and the 
military, each category is tiny and it is clear that virtually all civilian employees are 
covered by the NMW.  Someone who loses her job in a care home because the NMW is 
set too high is unlikely to join the military or become a share-fisherman in order to get 
work.  Therefore it cannot be held that the modest employment effects of the NMW are a 
consequence of having a significant uncovered sector. 
                                                 
8 Section 54 defines a worker as: an individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the 
employment has ceased, worked under) – a contract of employment; or any other contract, whether express 
or implied and (if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or 
perform personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue of 
the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the 
individual. 
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b. Possible explanations 
 
Short run versus long run 
 
Textbook theory refers to the long run adjustment of employment.  In the short run both 
the labour input may be costly to adjust (e.g. unfair dismissal claims or redundancy 
payments) and non-labour inputs similarly costly to adjust or may be “sunk” (e.g. as Card 
and Kreuger suggest, the physical structure of a fast food restaurant).  With costly 
adjustments or sunken inputs, employment will not automatically respond immediately to 
an increase in the minimum wage: “Rather, adjustments will take place over the long run, 
as some firms exit the industry, others gradually downsize, and potential entrants are 
deterred from starting new firms” (Card and Kreuger 1995 p.367). 
 
This presents a problem.  The longer the time horizon, the more other factors come into 
play to also influence employment.  For example the Working Time Regulations came 
into force around the same time as the NMW.  One important strand of this Directive is 
that all workers must have at least 4 weeks paid holiday.  Low paid employees were more 
affected by this Directive than others – they previously had fewer weeks of paid holidays 
than higher paid workers.  Each extra week of paid holiday was equivalent to a 2% 
increase in the labour costs of that worker.  So this might influence employment around 
the time of the introduction of the NMW.  More recently, the steep rise in energy costs 
has been cited by the hospitality sector as a factor influencing employment. 
 
In fact many of the studies cited in tables 5 and 6 do extend over more than a few months.  
When analysing the introduction of the NMW Stewart (2004a) went back 5 years (it was 
widely known that there would be a NMW from around 1995) and the two studies on 
hours went forward two years after the introduction of the NMW.  The study of care 
homes similarly allowed for time to adjust and the WERS panel provides information on 
the change in employment over a six year period 1998-2004.  Therefore my judgement is 
that it is unlikely that the lack of significant employment effects is a consequence of the 
studies all focusing on the short run.  And, in any event, it is pretty much impossible to 
test for long run effects because so many other variables affect long run employment. 
 
Not fully studied large rise in NMW 2003-06 
 
The largest single impact on pay came at the time of the introduction of the NMW in 
1999.  As table 2 indicates, the NMW then fell relative to the median in 2000 and 2001.  
Subsequently it has risen relative to the median by 7 percentage points.  The research 
reported in section 4 concentrates on the employment effects of the introduction and 
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uprating of the NMW up to 2004 and finds little or no impact.  But one must not 
conclude that, therefore, the later upratings similarly caused no job losses.  This has not 
yet been thoroughly investigated.  The significant ratcheting-up of the NMW between 
2003 and 2006 will surely provide another good test of the textbook model once the 
relevant data are available. 
 
Mobility out of minimum wage employment 
For two fifths of workers a minimum wage job in one year is a stepping stone to a higher 
paid job the next year.  This matters because the probability of remaining in employment 
is positively associated with the wage.  Bryan and Taylor (2006) and Jones et al. (2004) 
carefully analysed this issue using data on workers aged 22-60/65 from the BHPS and 
LFS respectively for the period 1999 to 2004.  In each study low pay is defined as being 
paid at or below the prevailing NMW.  Their findings are rather similar. 
 
Bryan and Taylor examined individuals’ work history over the period 1999-2004.  The 
two key findings are: (i) NMW receipt is quite common: over one worker in five was 
paid at or below the NMW at least once in the six years; (ii) but only half the recipients 
were on the NMW for more than one year.  The details concerning the proportion of 
workers never in receipt of the NMW, occasional receipt (1 or 2 years) or persistent 
receipt (3 or more years) were: 
 
 
Category 
 
% 
 % 
conditional 
on NMW 
receipt 
 
no NMW, always in work 
no NMW, not always in work 
occasional NMW, always in work 
occasional NMW, not always in work 
persistent NMW 
 
 
57.9 
20.0 
9.2 
7.7 
5.2 
 
- 
- 
41.5 
34.9 
23.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
The average duration of a low paid job 1999-2004 was, state Jones et al., 1.5 years.  They 
analysed year to year exit rates from low pay (rather than experience over all 6 years): 
 % 
remain at or below the NMW 
exit to higher paying job 
exit to unemployment 
exit to inactivity 
 44 
 40 
 4 
 12 
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Thus, consistent with Bryan and Taylor, under half of workers defined as low paid in one 
year remain in that state in the next year, and the great majority who exit from low pay do 
so for a better paying job where the probability of remaining in employment is higher. 
 
Non-compliance 
 
Non-compliance can be thought of as equivalent to the uncovered sector (see e.g. 
Ashenfelter and Smith 1979).  ONS (2005), using ASHE, indicate that in April 2005 
327,000 jobs were paid below the NMW split roughly equally between full-time and part-
time, with women more likely than men to be in a job paid below the NMW.  Second 
jobs are more likely to pay below the NMW than main jobs (Ormerod 2006).  However, 
this 327,000 figure – or 1.3% of UK jobs – does not necessarily represent non-
compliance. 
 
First, some among this group are paid below the NMW for good reasons.  Some 
apprentices and trainees are exempt from the NMW.  And if employees receive free 
accommodation employers are entitled to offset the hourly rate (see LPC 2006, chapter 4). 
 
Second, and of much more concern regarding compliance, is the unknown number of 
workers who either do not show up in the ASHE data or who appear in the data but 
whose hourly earnings figure is overstated, normally because hours are under-reported.  
On the basis of research, visits, oral and written evidence, and discussions with relevant 
Departments, the LPC believes that this non-compliant group is growing but it has proved 
impossible to quantify it (LPC 2005, chapter 6).  Sectors of concern include: Chinese and 
Indian restaurants, Chinese health shop chains, home working, nurseries, hairdressing, 
agriculture, food processing and some construction work.  Working arrangements include 
sub-contracting and many of the workers whose employer is not complying with the 
NMW are immigrants, legal and illegal. 
 
Consider the case of the Chinese community in London.  I have spoken (with an 
interpreter) to more than 10 employers and more than 20 workers.  The sectors include: 
restaurants, health shops, food manufacture and distribution and clothing.  In each case 
the employer was Chinese.  Not a single worker below the level of chef or shop manager 
was receiving the NMW.  Most of the workers had no written contracts and almost all 
were paid in cash.  None were receiving tax credits.  Chinese workers and employers all 
use a weekly wage as their benchmark.  In a sense the hours are irrelevant – the boss 
wants the job done and the worker has a weekly wage target.  It is unlikely these workers 
will appear in ASHE or the LFS even though some, at least, had national insurance 
numbers.  When the employer is required to submit any documentation to the authorities 
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he will do so via an accountant.  Thus a typical wage for a low skill worker in a Chinese 
takeaway restaurant is perhaps £180-£200 per week (cash) for 6 days working perhaps 
10am – 2pm and 5pm – 11.30pm, or 63 hours a week.  The corresponding hourly rate is 
around £3.  If necessary the accountant will understate the weekly hours to signify 
compliance with the NMW.  The Chinese community describe this practise of a weekly 
target for pay and downward manipulation of hours as follows: ‘Yǒu Xiĕ gōng rĕn zhuò 
quán zhĭ gōng zhuò deìn shì lăo băn bào shuì dán shàng zhí shi gé jiān zhi gong ren. 
 
In oral evidence sessions the LPC were told – by employers who do comply – of 
pervasive similar practices in fruit and vegetable picking and processing often involving 
Eastern Europeans and Chinese.  The sub-contracting arrangements in these sectors 
probably make non-compliance more difficult to monitor.  And in research for the LPC 
Ram et al. (2004) find considerable non-compliance in small firms in Leicester in the 
catering and clothing trades, again via the manipulation of hours when documentation 
was necessary. 
 
Presumably compliance depends, in part, on the probability of being caught not 
complying and the penalty for non-compliance.  Frankly it is amazing that so many 
employers do comply with the NMW.  A worker can bring a claim concerning 
underpayment to an Employment Tribunal to recover the money owed.  However, where 
a judgement is in favour of the worker but the employer fails to pay the award the 
Tribunal does not have the power to enforce the award and the worker must seek 
payment through the civil court system.  Not surprisingly, the number of Tribunal cases 
has fallen almost monotonically since 1999-2000, to 440 in 2005-06. 
 
Rather, the main enforcement action comes via HM Revenue and Customs.  HMRC must, 
statutorily, investigate all complaints of underpayment it receives.  Further, it carries out 
its own risk assessments and investigates employers accordingly.  Recently HMRC 
decided to target particular sectors, hairdressing in 2005 and childcare nurseries in 2006.  
Each year since 1999-2000 HMRC has made around 5000 visits to an employer, some 
two fifths originating from a complaint to HMRC by a worker.  In 2005-06 non-
compliance was found in 1582 (32% of) cases.  There are around 1.6 million employers 
in the UK.  Therefore a typical employer can expect a visit from HMRC once every 320 
years and to be found not complying once a millennium.  The probability of being caught 
for non-compliance does not appear to give a strong incentive to comply.  Compare this 
with enforcement under the previous Wage Council system.  In 1998 the Department of 
Employment Wages Inspectorate had 71 inspectors.  They checked wages in 30,000 
establishments visiting two thirds of these, equivalent to 280 visits per inspector per year 
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(DE 1988).  By contrast HMRC has slightly more inspectors in 2006 (90) who make an 
average of just 55 visits each in a year. 
 
Ram et al. (2004) studied 20 mainly non-complying small businesses in the Midlands.  
Only one – a clothing company – had had an inspection:  “An inspector came three weeks 
ago to look around.  He sent a letter to all our employees saying if you are being paid the 
NMW don’t reply.  Obviously they’re all in cahoots with their family credit.  I’m not 
doing anything wrong. . . He found no problem.  He was supposed to come in for the day 
– he spent an hour going through the books and two hours talking about [the local 
football team].  This was an Inland Revenue check” (p.37). 
 
There is a further issue here.  HMRC tend to visit “proper” employers – as a complying 
gang-master put it in evidence “those with filing cabinets” (Association of Labour 
Providers 2006).  Presumably employers without filing cabinets – who are less likely to 
get a visit – are less likely to comply, not just with the NMW but also with tax, insurance, 
working time and health and safety regulations. 
 
And what if the employer is caught not complying?  He is a naughty boy, and must pay 
back the arrears (an average of £130 per worker in 2005-06).  Providing he does so there 
is no other penalty.  In effect he has had an interest-free loan from the worker.  If the 
employer does not reimburse the arrears HMRC can issue an enforcement notice and then 
a penalty notice such that the employer would face a fairly modest fine. 
 
In serious cases HMRC can bring a criminal prosecution for any one of six criminal 
offences: refusal or wilful neglect to pay the minimum wage; failing to keep minimum 
wage records; keeping false records; producing false records or information; intentionally 
obstructing an enforcement officer; and refusing or neglecting to give information to an 
enforcement officer.  Each offence carries a maximum fine of £5000.  No such criminal 
prosecutions have been taken to date. 
 
Thus the typical employer gets caught for not complying with the NMW once every 
thousand years and there is no penalty for such non-compliance.  It is not surprising that 
non-compliance is probably on the increase.  The LPC has frequently drawn attention to 
this feeble enforcement and the trivial penalties (see e.g. LPC 2005, chapter 4) but they 
are yet to be beefed-up. 
 
It is possible that one favourable unintended side-effect of non-compliance – the de facto 
uncovered sector – is smaller employment effects in the covered sector.  Maybe the 
findings in tables 5 and 6 flow from non-compliance, but it seems unlikely.  Most of the 
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studies use data from e.g. NES/ASHE or WERS where the employers are likely to be 
complying employers.  And most workers in non-complying firms are unlikely to show 
up in the LFS.  Thus a difference-in-difference study just before and just after the 
introduction / uprating in the NMW comparing workers just above / just below the NMW 
which finds no employment effects is probably not achieving that finding because those 
just below prior to the introduction / uprating in the NMW switch to non-compliance 
rather than  non-employment. 
 
What does seem more likely is that there would be employment effects in the non-
complying sector, like the Chinese labour market in London, if the NMW were properly 
enforced.  The Chinese restaurant, health and clothing product markets are fiercely 
competitive and employers uniformly try to keep the lid on their labour costs.  Further, as 
Ram et al. (2004) note in their parallel study of the informal sector in the Midlands, non-
enforcement of the NMW may arise “due to passive by-standing or tacit encouragement 
(since informal economic activity can be viewed as a means of generating employment 
among otherwise socially excluded sections of the population, often in decaying urban 
areas)” (p.9).  Ram et al. clearly believe that full compliance would force many small 
businesses in the clothing and catering sector to close but, interestingly, believe that such 
closure, would be for the best: “The purpose of the minimum wage laws going back to 
the original Trade Boards of 1909 is, after all, to eliminate ‘sweating’, and if competitive 
survival is possible only with sub-minimum wages then the conclusion is that the relevant 
firms have to be pressed out of business” (p.49). 
 
Offsets 
 
When labour costs rise because of the minimum wage the employer has an incentive to 
economise elsewhere.  There is not much scope for cutting back on fringe benefits like 
subsidised meals or generous pension provision because the incidence of such benefits 
for minimum wage workers is low both absolutely and relative to higher paid workers. 
 
On an LPC visit I came across a very nice example of an offset concerning company 
provided training in a high street chemist retail chain.  Previously, when a worker was 
off-site to receive some formal training the management provided a replacement worker 
but now it no longer did so.  Either the existing colleagues had to work a bit harder or 
service to the customer worsened.  This is, strictly, an employment effect but it might be 
hard to spot in an econometric study.  Note, however, this policy was not introduced 
solely because of the NMW, there were other factors like the working time regulations 
which also raised labour costs. 
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Probably the main offset sustaining employment comes courtesy of the state rather than 
the employer.  The NMW sets a floor to pay but is unrelated to family income.  In order 
to make work pay the government uses tax credits (see appendix).  For given family 
circumstances the tax credit is larger the lower the pay received.  There is evidence of 
illegal collusion between employers and workers such that both gain at the expense of the 
state (for detailed discussion see e.g. Ram et al. 2004 p.29).  It works as follows.  The 
employer understates the pay of the worker, but understates the hours by even more to 
demonstrate compliance with the NMW.  This permits the worker to get a larger amount 
of tax credit and the employer to pay a correspondingly lower hourly wage.  The 
employer, for consistency, understates his own turnover which lowers his VAT and 
income tax burden.  One reason the NMW was introduced was to put a lid on aggregate 
tax credit payments.  Such collusive behaviour between the worker and the boss lifts that 
lid, but it may have the unintended favourable side-effect of higher employment – e.g. in 
Indian and Bangladeshi restaurants or Indian clothing manufacturers – than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 
c. Probable explanations 
 
Productivity and effort 
 
The NMW might increase labour productivity in a number of different ways.  First, if 
capital is substituted for labour this capital deepening raises labour productivity.  Second, 
employers may respond by improving the quality of their capital.  Next, the labour 
quantity per head or per hour will rise if there is an intensification of effort.  This can 
come about through an increase in monitoring or because employees are motivated to 
work harder because of the higher wage.  And if the higher wage reduces labour turnover 
this will also tend to increase the quantity of labour input because less time is spent on 
hiring and induction of new workers.  Fourth, the quality of the labour input might 
increase if the skill mix alters or if individual workers’ human capital gets augmented 
through extra education or training.  Finally, employers may pay more attention to work 
organisation to achieve extra output per unit of labour and capital input.  In theory it 
should be possible to measure each of these five routes to higher level productivity.  In 
practice the growth in labour productivity is normally held to depend on capital 
deepening (changes in the capital:labour ratio) and the growth in total factor productivity 
(TFP) – the residual from the other four channels.  Any substitution of capital for labour 
will tend to reduce employment whereas greater effort, better organisation and more 
investment in human capital will tend to moderate any employment effects of the NMW 
and may even raise employment.  Evidence on labour productivity (see table 8) is from 
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industries, two nationally representative samples of firms, the low paying sectors and 
individuals. 
 
Forth and O’Mahoney (2003) first consider labour productivity growth (defined as 
growth in real value added per hour worked) in seven low paying sectors for 1995-98 
before the NMW and 1999-2000 after the NMW.  They suggest that there was an 
acceleration in the growth in labour productivity in textiles, security and hairdressing 
around the time the NMW was introduced, but no such acceleration in retail, hospitality, 
cleaning or clothing and footwear.  Second, they correlate across 183 industries the wage 
bill impact or “bite” of the NMW and the growth in labour productivity for each year 
1995-2000.  The correlations are positive but non-significant. 
 
Draca et al. (2006) consider a representative sample of 378 firms over 6 years.  They use 
the difference-in-difference technique comparing the “policy on” period 1999-2002 with 
the “policy off” period 1996-99.  The treatment group consists of low wage firms 
(average wage below £12000 pa) in a low wage region – industry where more than a 
tenth of the workers in the relevant cell were previously paid below the minimum.  The 
control group is higher wage firms (average wage £12000 - £20000 pa).  Productivity is 
defined as sales divided by employment.  Control variables include industry, region, firm 
age, capital-sales ratio and various workforce characteristics.  In the policy-on period 
compared with the policy-off period the treatment group experience a gain of 
productivity of 5.4% compared to the control group but the association is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Evidence on productivity movements in firms in the ONS Annual Business Inquiry 
around the time of the introduction of the NMW was examined by Galindo-Rueda and 
Pereira (2004).  They matched the firms with: (i) individual workers in the New Earnings 
Survey (NES); (ii) industry/region cells from the NES.  The treatment group was defined 
by the fraction of workers paid below a minimum 1998 threshold either inside the firm or 
inside the relevant industry/region cell.  In each case the authors reported separate results 
for manufacturing and services.  Productivity was defined as gross output per worker and, 
in one investigation, total factor productivity.  The core of the analysis was to determine 
relative productivity movements between the treatment and control firms around the time 
of the introduction of the NMW.  The evidence suggests that labour productivity in firms 
affected by the NMW rose relative to the control group – in one investigation by 11% and 
in the other by 6-17%.  This hike in labour productivity was stronger for firms in services 
than in manufacturing. 
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Productivity in the residential care home sector was analysed by Machin et al. (2003) 
using a sample of between 486 and 586 homes.  The two productivity indicators were the 
change before/after the introduction of the NMW in (i) residents per worker hour; (ii) the 
home manager’s subjective assessment of worker effort – up, same, down.  The study 
tested whether the change in productivity was associated with the initial fraction of 
workers affected by the NMW or by the initial wage gap.  Controls included both 
demographic and home characteristics.  All the associations were positive – for example 
a 10% increase in the wage gap was linked to a 9% increase in effort – but none were 
statistically significant.  A sub-sample of between 135 and 183 of these care homes was 
analysed in greater detail by Georgiadis (2006) for both the introduction of the NMW and 
the 2001 uprating.  The supervision intensity was negatively related to the wage: a 4% 
increase in the wage bill was associated with a 5% fall in the ratio of managerial to other 
workers. 
 
We also have case study evidence for other low paying sectors.  In textiles and in 
clothing and footwear Undy et al. (2001) and Heyes and Gray (2001) suggest there was 
some work-intensification.  In retail and hospitality the large LPC survey (LPC 2000, 
table A5.7) – where those affected by the NMW were more likely to respond than those 
unaffected – suggested more attention to labour costs but most respondents said the 
changes they had made were “slight” rather than “significant”.  In cleaning and security 
Bullock et al. (2001) suggest price rises, increased attention to labour costs and lower 
profits were adjustment mechanisms rather than moves to raise productivity. 
 
Labour productivity can also be increased if the employer invests more in the human 
capital of the workforce.  Arulampalam et al. (2004) investigated this route using data on 
some 2500 individuals from the BHPS prior to and after the introduction of the NMW.  
The familiar difference-in-difference technique compared the treatment group of those 
whose wage was previously below the NMW with a control group of those previously 
paid at the NMW or up to 15% above it.  Both the incidence (probability) and intensity 
(days) of training were examined.  The results are clear cut.  In the raw data the 
likelihood and intensity of training received by the treatment group increased relative to 
the control group.  And when the difference-in-difference statistical technique is used, 
with demographic and firm control, the authors state that – comparing the treatment 
group with the control group – the training probability increased by 8-11 percentage 
points and the intensity (days) of training by 10 percentage points.  Both these results 
were statistically significant.  Dickerson (2006) undertook a similar study using the LFS.  
He too finds an increase in the probability of training for the treatment groups compared 
with the control group but the increase is not statistically significant.  It should be noted 
in passing that this work suggests that the competitive model may not be a complete 
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description of the low paid labour market.  If the labour market is competitive it is 
predicted that the minimum wage makes it less profitable to employ unskilled workers.  
But in a non-competitive labour market the firm is getting a rent and so would like to 
retain the worker – and the firm now has an incentive to improve the productivity of the 
employee via training in order to restore the surplus. 
 
Summarising, the evidence from industries and firms across the whole economy and for 
the care home sector suggests a positive association between the NMW and productivity, 
but typically not statistically significant.  Unfortunately it is impossible to generalise 
whether or not this apparent weak advance in labour productivity triggered by the NMW 
was the result of employment-reducing capital deepening or employment-stabilising 
work intensification and better work organisation.  Thus study of different industries 
(Forth and O’Mahoney 2003) suggests capital-labour substitution in security but 
improved organisation in textiles.  The nationally representative investigation of firms 
(Draca et al. 2006) points to the employment-stabilising routes to higher productivity 
because it controls for differences among firms in their capital:sales ratio.  Likewise the 
case study evidence points to some work intensification in clothing and textiles (Heyes 
and Grey 2001) and for care homes both more effort (Machin et al. 2003) and less 
monitoring and supervision (Georgiadis 2006).  On balance the evidence favours 
employment-stabilisation routes rather than substitution of capital for labour.  This 
conclusion is reinforced by the evidence that the NMW led to more workers receiving 
training and longer durations of such training. 
 
Prices 
 
If any increase in labour costs caused by the NMW can be passed on through higher 
prices any employment effects will be that much smaller.  There have never been any 
suggestions, for example in the Bank of England quarterly Inflation Report, that the 
NMW ratcheted-up the aggregate inflation rate.  This is not surprising.  Assume a mean 
hourly UK wage of £10 and a 25p increase in the NMW applying to 7% of jobs.  This 
would raise the aggregate wage bill by just 0.17%.  As Wadsworth (2007) puts it: “RPI 
does not change at the time the NMW changes, indicating that overall the NMW had little 
impact on prices”. 
 
Rather, the issue concerns the relative prices of goods and services produced by 
minimum wage workers.  Wadsworth (2007) is the only investigation of this matter.  He 
first ranks sectors according to the incidence of minimum wage employment (see table 8).  
Nine of the top ten sectors on this indicator concern consumer services so he omits the 
tenth sector industrial cleaning.  The nine sectors employ one sixth of minimum wage 
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workers.  Using the Family Expenditure Survey 1997-2005 he does a difference-in-
difference analysis before/after the NMW, benchmarking the sector prices against the 
RPI.  Given the labour intensive nature of these consumer services it is not surprising that 
their prices rose, on average, by one percentage point a year more than the RPI 
throughout the period.  But, more importantly, after the NMW was introduced these 
prices rose, on average, by an extra 0.8% a year relative to the RPI.  These relative price 
movements are ranked in column 2 and range from an extra 2.2% a year in home 
cleaning down to 0.1% in hairdressing. 
 
The ability to raise relative prices is related, albeit weakly, to the own-price elasticity of 
demand.  For the top five sectors (home cleaning, road travel, hotels, canteen meals and 
takeaway food) where the relative price increase is statistically significant, only one of 
the five has an own-price elasticity greater than minus 1 suggesting it is easier to pass on 
price increases.  By contrast two of the bottom four sectors (pub drinks, restaurant meals, 
dry cleaning/laundry and hairdressing) have an own-price elasticity greater than minus 1, 
so it is more difficult for them to pass on price increases. 
 
It is clear that the price of consumer services provided by NMW workers has risen, since 
the NMW, relative to the RPI.  Thus some of the increase in costs has been passed on via 
higher prices thus attenuating any employment effects.  We complete the picture with a 
diversion on the income distribution consequences.  When the wage councils were first 
established in the UK the Webbs (1911 pp 780-783) pointed out that if minimum wage 
goods and services are disproportionately consumed by minimum wage workers and the 
prices of these items rise, then the minimum wage workers may be no better off than 
before the minimum wage.  It will be seen in column 4 that the price effects are spread 
over all households and not especially concentrated on minimum wage households.  
There are 11.6% minimum wage households in the FES example.  They consume 
disproportionately more of pub drinks, canteen meals, takeway food, road travel and 
restaurant meals but consume disproportionately less hairdressing, dry cleaning/laundry, 
hotels and home cleaning.  It seems that the distributional consequences of relative price 
movements associated with the NMW are pretty neutral. 
 
Profits 
 
It is possible that profits took the strain.  This can be investigated using evidence from 
firms and sectors and by analysing movements in the share of profits in national income. 
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Firms and sectors 
 
There are three studies using information from firms and sectors concerning the way the 
NMW altered profits.  Draca et al. (2005) analyse data from both a representative sample 
of UK firms and a sample of care homes.  Georgiadis (2006) is a follow-up study of the 
2001 uprating for a sub-sample of care homes.  Experian (2006) analyse profits in the 
retail and hospitality sectors 1999-2004. 
 
Details of the Draca et al. (2006) research is set out in table 10.  Consider first the 
representative sample of UK firms drawn from the Financial Analysis Made Ease (FAME) 
dataset.  The balanced panel is 342 firms over six years 1996-2002 yielding 2052 
observations.  The unbalanced panel consists of some 700 firms with 3820 observations.  
The method is difference-in-difference.  The first difference is pre- and post- the 
introduction of the NMW.  The second difference is to compare the treatment group of 
low wage firms (average wage below £12000 pa) with the control group of higher wage 
(£12000-£20000 pa) firms. 
 
Average wages in a firm might be misleading.  For this analysis to make sense it is 
important that low wage workers are concentrated in low average wage firms.  The 
alternative is that they are spread over the whole distribution of firms.  WERS 1998 data 
show that there is a very strong negative correlation between the fraction of workers paid 
below £3.50 an hour and the average wage in the workplace – the required concentration 
exists.  Over 1996-2002 pay in the low wage firms grew by 21% against 12% for the 
higher wage firms.  Profits are defined as gross profit (prior to deductions for tax interest 
and dividends) as a fraction of turnover (sales).  The controls are industry, region, capital-
sales ratio, percent graduates, percent female and percent union, use of IT from the 3-
digit SIC. 
 
The results are clear-cut: “profitability fell in firms that were more affected by the NMW 
introduction”.  The difference-in-difference change in profitability is -0.027 to  
-0.042.  The original profit margin in these firms was 0.40.  So profit margins fell, at the 
mean of the treatment group, by 8% to 11%.  If this fall in profits was concentrated on 
firms with low initial profits, the affect of the NMW on lowering profits would be that 
much larger. 
 
We saw in section 2 that the NMW had a substantial affect on wages in the care home 
sector.  Draca et al. (2006) analyse whether or not homes which had to raise their wages 
the most (i.e. those with the largest wage gap) experienced the biggest drop in profits.  
This is indeed the case.  The mean wage gap was .04.  The elasticity of the profit margin 
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with respect to the wage gap was -.6, so the average firm faced a reduction in its profit 
margin of .024.  Its original profit margin was .102 so the NMW reduced profit for this 
average home by 23%.  Georgiadis (2006) undertook a follow-up study of the 2001 
uprating for 112 care homes on the south coast.  He used the same method, definitions 
and controls as Draca et al. (2006).  There was negative association between homes with 
a larger fraction of affected workers or larger wage gap and profitability, but it was not 
statistically significant.  The evidence suggests that in 1999 firms did not pass on any 
higher labour costs via higher prices so profits fell, whereas in 2001 they raised prices to 
help protect profit margins. 
 
Evidence from both the representative sample of UK firms and a sample of care homes, 
the lowest paying sector of the labour market, demonstrates that the introduction of the 
NMW was associated with a fall in profits.  This tempering of profits was not associated 
with an increased likelihood of a firm or care home closing down.  Therefore Draca et al. 
conclude that “firms were making profits from paying low wages prior to the minimum 
wage introduction and that one consequence of the introduction of the minimum wage to 
the UK labour market was to moderate these “excess” profits by channelling them back 
to the wages of low paid workers”. 
 
Profits in the retail and hospitality sectors have been studied by Experian (2006) over the 
period 1999-2004 using regional data on the bite of the NMW in the sector and the 
movements in gross operating surplus.  The relative gross operating surplus was lower in 
regions where the bite of the NMW was strongest but the association was not statistically 
significant. 
 
In summary, taking all three studies, the evidence suggests that the initial introduction of 
the NMW caused a relative fall in profits in the more affected firms.  In the care home 
and retail sector subsequent upratings in the NMW are negatively associated with profits 
but the link is not statistically significant – essentially the upratings did not cause a 
further fall in profitability. 
 
Profit shares 
 
The NMW affected profits at a micro-level – firms employing low wage workers 
experienced a relative fall in their profits.  But it is also possible that the NMW 
influenced profits at the macro-level.  Calculating the shares of national income going to 
labour (wages) and capital (profits) is fraught with difficulty.  The measurement 
problems include how to treat: public sector employees and corporations; self employed; 
rent; North Sea oil/gas; financial corporations; capital consumption; taxation; inflation 
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(current/historic cost accounting).  Fortunately, even though many researchers do not 
give these measurement issues sufficient attention, the trends are pretty clear.  In the 
quarter-century 1950-1975 the profit share fell, consistent with the downward secular 
trend from the beginning of the century (Phelps Brown 1968, Spencer 1988, Glynn 2007).  
For the next two decades, around 1975 to the mid-1990s, the profit share rose 
substantially (Boyd 2004).  This probably reflects the decline of union membership and 
power, more efficient organisation of work and the huge growth in the effective world 
labour supply as China, India and ex-CIS countries enhanced their contribution to world 
trade. 
 
Profits peaked as a share of private GDP at the very time the Low Pay Commission was 
established in 1997 (Boyd 2004, Bank of England 2006).  Using the profit benchmark 
preferred by the Bank of England figure 5 shows that the profit share fell by a quarter 
around the time the NMW was introduced and since 1997 that share has always been 
lower than the average profit share since 1980.  This fall in profit share in the last decade 
is confirmed in all official measures set out in table 11.  Broadly, the wage share has 
increased by 2 percentage points while the profit share is, correspondingly, 2 points lower.  
Many factors influence profit shares.  The overvalued exchange rate probably contributed 
to the fall after 1997.  And recently companies have used resources to help make good 
deficits in their pension funds, and have absorbed (in part at least) higher energy costs.  
But the association between the establishment of the LPC, the introduction and uprating 
of the NMW and the decay in profit share is also suggestive.  In particular, it may be 
more difficult for firms to pass back to workers the cost of this labour market regulation 
than the cost of, for example, extra holiday entitlement and extended maternity leave. 
 
Hours, not workers 
 
In the theory section we noted that in the short run the firm may adjust hours rather than 
workers.  There is some evidence for this (see section 4).  None of the studies of 
individuals using the difference-in-difference technique found any employment (i.e. 
worker) effects but Stewart and Swaffield (2002, 2004) reported modest cuts in hours for 
those affected by the NMW.  Connolly and Gregory (2002) did not find hours reductions 
for their sample of female workers although the longer the time period analysed the 
closer they got to such a result. 
 
Possible adjustments in hours was pursued by the LPC in oral evidence (2/11/06) from 
the British Retail Consortium and USDAW, the shopworkers union.  The major retail 
grocery chains allocate an aggregate amount of labour to each store by week, day and 
time of day.  Adjustments come via the number of part-time shifts or hours per individual 
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shift.  For one major retailer the aggregate hours allocation is based on predicted turnover 
two weeks hence and the manager is allocated 9.6% of that turnover for the wage bill.  If 
the manager can operate with a lower fraction s/he gets a higher annual bonus.  Clearly 
any uprating of the NMW which affects the wage bill will cause the manager to look 
closely at labour costs with any fine-tuning normally via the number of part-time shifts. 
 
Modern monopsony 
 
Traditional monopsony – the company town – is unlikely to exist in the present low paid 
labour market.  But modern monopsony where a degree of labour market power co-exists 
with competition among employers is very likely.  Manning (2003, chapter 13) sets out 
fifteen empirical findings supporting the idea of monopsonistic wage determination.  
These are not rehearsed here.  Instead we limit discussion to employer wage policies, 
mainly drawn from research commissioned by the LPC. 
 
First, government statisticians (Lam et al. 2006) state that: “there is both theoretical 
support and anecdotal evidence for the idea that firms have the flexibility to set their own 
wages and use it in this segment of the labour market . . . companies have significant 
power to set wages at an appropriate level” (p.10 and 23). 
 
Second, in their very detailed study of small firms in the Midlands, Ram et al. (2004) 
provide numerous examples of company wage setting.  For example: “Employers in the 
restaurant sector also tended to dictate levels of pay in their firms” (p.30).  A main reason 
“for workers staying in these firms . . . [was] their limited labour market opportunities 
and their narrow range of comparisons with other jobs” (p.3).  In one firm an employee 
“praises the firm’s friendly atmosphere and good colleagues” but “confesses to feeling 
demoralised and trapped . . . I would love to leave but I have no other qualification and I 
am too afraid to take a risk now” (p.24). 
 
Third, the evidence (see section 4d) from industrial relations studies suggests a reactive, 
muddling through, approach to dealing with the NMW.  The text book competitive labour 
demand curve would tend to apply if, instead, the firms took a more strategic approach.  
This would involve deliberately minimising labour costs by cutting workers or hours, or a 
move upmarket such that more skilled workers would be substituted for less skilled 
workers.  There was no evidence of such behaviour in the studies surveyed.  Rather the 
employers tended to use the inherent flexibility in the tasks to muddle through.  They also 
mostly reported that the NMW had tended to make it easier to fill vacancies. 
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This is all evidence, over and above the detailed documentation by Manning, that the 
standard textbook model is an incomplete description of the low paid labour market.  The 
frictions give the firms some power over their employees.  In these circumstances a 
minimum wage set modestly above the existing wage might [note: not “will”] raise both 
pay and employment.  This is one plausible explanation for the lack of employment 
effects in these low paying sectors and in the economy as a whole. 
 
 
6. Some History 
 
a. Context 
 
In order to understand the impact of the NMW on pay and employment this paper has 
examined, inter alia, pay setting, coverage of the NMW, competitive versus 
monopsonistic labour markets, (non-) compliance, offsets and the interaction between the 
NMW and the social security system.  But similar issues were also analysed a century 
ago. 
 
In the mid-1890s Fabian writers coined the slogan the “national minimum” to describe 
their political and social policy of spreading previous state intervention regulating factory 
conditions and public health into, for example, wage determination, the duration of 
compulsory schooling, the need for old age pensions, reform of the poor laws, the 
extension of workers compensation for industrial injuries and improving housing 
conditions (McBriar 1966). 
 
Beatrice Webb (neé Potter) had, together with Charles Booth, investigated the sweated 
conditions (low pay, long hours, unsanitary working) of the tailors of the East End of 
London.  She gave evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Sweating (1890) 
which reported that its evils “could scarcely be exaggerated . . . . earnings barely 
sufficient to sustain existence; hours of labor such as to make the lives of the workers 
periods of almost ceaseless toil, hard and unlovely to the last degree; sanitary conditions 
injurious to the health of the persons employed and dangerous to the public”.  In 1891 Sir 
Charles Dilke advocated minimum wage legislation for the sweated trades but failed to 
get the legislation passed.  The Fabian Society then embraced the cause, setting out the 
cause of and remedy for sweating (Fabian Society 1894) and emphasising how women 
were at risk from the sweating system (Webb 1896).  In their magisterial Industrial 
Democracy the Webbs (1897) advocated minimum wage protection as a component of 
the overall “national minimum” policy but they were agnostic between a system of trade 
boards by sector, based on the experience of Victoria in Australia, simultaneously 
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advocated in a Fabian tract (Macrosty 1897), and a legal national minimum wage for all 
workers, identical by region and industry.  Indeed they only devoted half a page in a book 
of some one thousand pages to the fixing of the minimum wage. 
 
The return to power of the Liberal government in 1906 opened the door to minimum 
wage legislation.  It initiated an enquiry into rates of wages in the lowest paying 
industries (Board of Trade 1906) and the results were “even more shocking than had been 
expected” (McBriar 1966 p.260).  The Fabian Society (Sanders 1906) weighed in with 
the first fully argued case for a national minimum wage and a further analysis of sweating 
(Hutchins 1907).  In 1909 the Trade Boards Act was passed which established minimum 
wage machinery for tailoring, paper box making, machine-made lace finishing and the 
chain-making trades, with provision for extension to further trades if the Board of Trade 
considered the wages to be exceptionally low.9  The Fabians welcomed this law although 
some members now favoured a wage based on subsistence needs rather than what the 
trade would bear (Fabian Society 1906 and second edition of Hutchins 1907). 
 
The zenith of the Fabian contribution was the 1906 tract The Case for a Legal Minimum 
Wage (Sanders 1906) which was the first fully articulated call for a national minimum 
wage in Great Britain.  This is a remarkable and sadly neglected document.  In a mere 18 
pages it discusses all the topics listed in the first paragraph above as well as matters like 
child labour and living wages as compared with minimum wages.  The tract was also a 
creature of its time.  It advocated a lower minimum wage for women than for men; 
suggested that some unemployment would be a “blessing in disguise”; and, while not 
hostile to immigration, had some salty views on Jews and the Chinese – “the cunning of 
the yellow man”.  In this section we examine this imposing chronicle, with side-glances 
at the related tracts and the work of the Webbs, Marshall, Pigou and other contemporary 
social scientists. 
 
b. The wage 
 
The discussion of the minimum wage in the 1906 tract covered the institutional 
machinery, the method of calculation, gender pay, the conversion of time rates to piece 
rates and deductions for the provision of accommodation.  These are all topics that 
successive reports of the Low Pay Commission grapple with a century later. 
                                                 
9 In a few small homeworking occupations there already existed voluntary boards, for example the Racquet 
and Five Ball trade – the Balls Board! There were only three manufacturers in the world, employing 40 
homeworkers. The chief buyers of the balls were the public schools, who were prepared to pay a higher 
price provided the workers got a higher wage. The Eton headmaster (1909) describes the Board in detail; he 
was its Chairman 
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The tract noted that there were “practical objections” – which it did not share – to 
calculating and fixing the NMW: 
“The work of calculating and fixing the minimum wage rate and of 
prevention of evasion would be so vast and minute that the wit of man 
could not devise machinery capable of coping with it” (p.5). 
Evidence concerning successful intervention in wage setting in Australia and New 
Zealand was presented to refute such practical objections (see also Macrosty 1897).  
Current evidence suggests that such objections were wrong concerning calculating and 
fixing the NMW but have great relevance to inspection and evasion. 
The Webbs (1897) also dealt with concerns of economists and industrialists.  They noted 
that: “from the viewpoint of the employer, one way of increasing the cost of production is 
the same as another” (p.773) and thus argued that their national minimum policy should 
apply to wages as well as sanitation and hours.  They also emphasise that the intervention 
was designed to enforce minimum standards, not to arbitrate all wage rates. 
 
Three principles were to underpin the NMW: 
• It should be “sufficient to enable our workers to be maintained in healthy existence.  
Therefore the wage should be calculated on what the worker requires for physical 
health and efficiency, and not what the trade will bear”. 
• The “law must be national, that is it must apply to the whole country”. 
• It is to be a “national minimum of real wages: that is to say a wage as, worked out in 
its cash equivalent, will equalise all local variations in cost of living” (p.9). 
The implementation of these principles was set out in some detail.  “Healthy subsistence” 
for a man was to be based on the “average family, reckoned as consisting of a man, his 
wife and three children”, while for a woman calculated for an “adult woman living by 
herself”.  The authors were surprisingly sanguine about defining the NMW in real terms: 
the calculation of “local variations in prices and rents would be made a part of the duties 
of county councils and boroughs” therefore “a staff of local inspectors would be 
required” (pp.14-15).  It was recognised that rent was the main item causing local 
variation in the cost of living (p.18).  But a Fabian colleague writing a year later 
(Hutchins 1907), while favouring the NMW, suggested that a money wage was more 
appropriate and “doubt the advisability of employing local authorities” to determine the 
cost of living.  The NMW was to be set on a weekly basis for a “normal” 56-hour 
workweek (p.16). 
 
Men were to have a higher NMW than women for three reasons.  First, men had more 
family responsibilities than women.  Second, men were of higher quality labour than 
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women.  Third, some women only worked for pin money.  Concerning family 
responsibilities: 
“The reason for paying men more highly than women is that under our 
marriage institutions the man is the woman’s paymaster for her domestic 
work . . . Therefore it is admitted that the man, having to support another 
adult and their children, must receive a wage sufficient to maintain these 
several persons, whilst the woman is regarded industrially as a single 
woman, needing only enough to support herself” (p.9). 
The document also justifies the gender pay gap because men and women “are two 
different qualities”.  It had been suggested that, as an alternative to the male wage being 
higher than the female wage, married men should be paid more than single men.  The 
Fabians correctly recognised that: 
If married men cost more in the labour market than single ones, employers 
would never employ a married man where a single one was available” (p.9). 
Yet in the next sentence: 
“. . . if men and women were paid at the same rates, men would always be 
employed in preference to women because, fairly or unfairly male labour is 
considered industrially superior to female.  The demand for ‘equal wages 
for men and women’ is perfectly well known to trade unionists as a device 
for keeping women out of men’s trades” (p.9). 
Further, some women only work for pin money: 
“It is quite a mistake to suppose that all direct recipients of starvation 
wages are starved.  A large number are well fed and even blooming lasses 
who are really supported at home by their parents, but are willing to work 
in a factory for the sake of five or six shillings [one shilling = 5p] a week 
pocket money and the comparative gaiety of factory life” (p.12). 
Nevertheless, with a certain amount of magnanimity, the Fabians do allow that: 
“. . . women may be and sometimes are, compelled to resort to prostitution 
to keep themselves alive.  The minimum wage, should, therefore, be 
sufficiently high to save them from so demoralising an alternative” (p.13). 
All in all: 
“The national minimum wage must conform to three conditions: (a) it must 
be lower for women than for men; (b) all men must have the same minimum 
wage, and all women the same minimum wage; (c) the man’s wage must be 
enough to support a family, and the woman’s to support a single 
independent adult” (p.9). 
 
The notion that the male minimum wage should be higher than that for women persisted 
for much of the twentieth century.  A NMW was discussed in the 1960s: in its 
consultative Green Paper the Department of Employment (1969) worked on the 
assumption that the rate for men would be greater than for women.  And this, despite the 
fact that Barbara Castle was the Secretary of State and that the Equal Pay Act was about 
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to come into force in 1970, albeit not fully implemented until 1975 (Manning 2003, 
chapter 7). 
 
Piecework or payment-by-results presents a thorny problem for the implementation of the 
NMW because the time rate has to be converted to a payment per piece for a standard 
effort level.  Both the LPC (e.g. 2003 Chapter 3) and DTI (2003) have spent considerable 
time and ingenuity dealing with this problem, particularly concerning homeworkers, the 
very group the Fabians believed comprised the nadir of the sweated trades.  The Fabians, 
with their optimism concerning state intervention and institution building, had no such 
concerns around piecework.  First, the national weekly minimum wage was to be divided 
by 56 to get an hourly rate.  Second, where necessary that time rate was to be rendered to 
a piece rate by a Trade Board, with representatives of employers and workers, for each 
industry.  Third, there was to be a proper inspectorate, particularly concerning 
homeworkers, such that employers would need to keep registers and records of wages 
paid, work done and the rate paid.  Not all contemporary observers were so sanguine.  
For example the Women’s Industrial Council (1909) believed it would be near impossible 
to translate a minimum wage into piece rates and to enforce the wage, especially for 
homeworkers. 
 
In some occupations the wage was paid partly in cash and partly in food and 
accommodation.  The Fabians cite shop assistants, waiters and domestic service as 
examples (p.16, 17) and write that this “will be troublesome”.  And how!  The LPC still 
struggles with the principle and details concerning deductions for accommodation (see 
e.g. LPC 2006, chapter 4) a topic which, in my view, it would be better to avoid 
altogether. 
 
c. Coverage 
 
Presently around 1-worker-in-10 has her/his wage directly raised by the NMW.  The 
Fabians also asked: “what is the number of persons who would immediately feel the 
effects of the enactment of a legal minimum wage?” (p.18).  Based on Rowntree’s 
investigations in York the tract states that some 5 million people are members of working 
families that have “incomes insufficient to maintain merely physical efficiency”.  If we 
use the tract’s own suggestion of a family with 3 children as a benchmark, this implies 
some 1 million workers with below subsistence wages.  At the time the Fabians wrote 
(1906) the occupied population (i.e. employment) was as follows (see DE 1971, table 
109). 
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 million  
Males  12.2  
females 
 married 
 single, widowed, divorced 
 5.1  
0.7 
4.4 
Total  17.3  
 
Thus the proposed coverage was around 6% (1m / 17.3m), a little lower than the 
coverage today, even though the Fabian NMW was based more on the notion of a 
subsistence wage for a family of five than on a minimum wage for an individual worker 
like today’s NMW. 
 
Such coverage was specifically intended to fill the vacuum resulting from the lack of 
collective organisation in the non-union sectors of the economy.  The NMW and trade 
boards: 
“would bring to the weakest sections of the workers a sense of the power of 
organisation and combination which, it is not too much to predict, would 
induce them to use the minimum wage as a stepping-stone to further 
improvements in industrial conditions” (p.18) 
 
d. Employment 
 
The Webbs and other Fabians emphasised both labour market frictions and the working 
of competition and we shall suggest that it is plausible that they influenced both Marshall 
and Pigou, Britain’s foremost early twentieth century economists.  Fabians did not care 
for orthodox economic thought concerning the labour market.  The Webbs (1897 Part III, 
chapter 1) were critical of, for example, McCulloch, J.S. Mills, Cairnes and Senior: 
“There appears to be a superstition held by economists and politicians, even 
by those who have no prejudice against state regulation in itself, that the 
cash relation between employer and employed is so sacred that to interfere 
with it by law is to commit the unpardonable economic and political sin” 
(p.4) . . . “It [political economy] misled the nation on every practical issue; 
and it would if it could, prevent the enactment of a minimum wage law by 
giving yet another mistaken verdict against it” (p.4) . . . “They [college 
professors] urge that the cost of production would be increased in industries 
where the minimum was enforced, and that therefore they would inevitably 
collapse owing to the falling off in the demand for their products which 
would result from the rise in price caused by the increased cost of 
production.  This would tend to swell the ranks of the unemployed” (p.5). 
Instead, the Fabians emphasised efficiency wages, monopsony, the lower female than 
male NMW, and what they considered to be the beneficial effects of some unemployment. 
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Just as, according to the Fabians, the Factory Acts banning child labour and imposing 
hours restrictions had boosted economic efficiency, so with an NMW: 
“the largest proportion of an increased wage would give the increased 
mental and physical vitality which are the nation’s real capital . . . [there 
would be] an increase of physical efficiency” (p.18). 
This echoes the Webbs (1897 p.779) “To put it plumply, if the employers paid more, the 
labor would quickly be worth more”. 
 
The need to supplement (or possibly displace) the standard competitive approach to 
labour market issues with one that emphasises frictions, so forcefully set out by Manning 
(2003), was anticipated by the Fabians.  The Webbs (1897 p.779) recognised that: “firms 
just struggling on the margin would probably go under” and the 1906 tract that:  
“A minimum wage law cannot help the unemployed.  On the contrary, we 
must frankly face the fact that it will increase their numbers at first” (p.11). 
But then came the monopsony argument.  The Webbs (1897 p.779, 783) noted that: “the 
mere fact that employers are at present paying lower wages than the proposed minimum 
is no proof that the labor is not “worth” more to them and their customers . . . there is no 
need to assume that anything like all those now receiving less than the National 
Minimum would be displaced by its enactment”.  And the 1906 tract states: 
“. . . a man who is actually employed at eighteen shillings [per week] may 
be quite employable at twenty-four, and a woman actually employed at 
twelve quite employable at eighteen.  That is, if their employer had either to 
raise their wages or refuse to employ them at all, he would be content to 
raise their wages and be content with less profit.  Consequently it must not 
be assumed that all the workers who are now receiving less than the legal 
minimum would be thrown out of employment” (p.12). 
Any female unemployment would be tempered by the lower female NMW because “if 
women and men were paid at the same rates, men would always be employed in 
preference to women” (p.10). 
 
Marshall (1920) and Pigou (1920) were neither prejudiced against state intervention in 
wage setting nor solely emphasised the adverse employment effects of such intervention.  
Marshall refers to the “weighty and able treatise” (fn 163) of the Webbs and states that “if 
it [a minimum wage] could be made effective, its benefits would be so great that it might 
be gladly accepted” (Book VI, chapter 13) although he was also exercised about its 
coverage and those who lost their jobs “because their work was not worth the minimum 
wage”.  Pigou was similarly even handed: “some workpeople will be ejected from 
employment” (Part III, chapter 5) but “In places and occupations where wages are low 
because low grade workpeople are being “exploited” by employers, paid less than they 
are worth, there is no reason to expect that the forcing of the wage rate up to a fair level 
will cause a [loss of jobs] for it will not pay employers to dispense with their services. . . 
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the enactment of a national minimum time-wage will incidentally prevent the payment of 
certain low wages that are unfair, in the sense that they are the result of exploitation” 
(Part III, chapter 19).  Marshall and Pigou thus took a much more balanced view than 
some of their strident successors (e.g. Walters 1998, Macrae 1999) who predicted that the 
introduction of the NMW would cause “mayhem” in the low paying sectors and that it 
was “utter nonsense” to argue that employment might not fall in such sectors. 
 
The Fabian view of unemployment resulting from a minimum wage is rather interesting 
in that it was held to possibly be beneficial and once-and-for-all: 
“. . . instead of being deplored [it] should be welcomed. . . if some 
occupations were unable to bear the costs of a minimum wage it would 
obviously be a national benefit for them to disappear” (p.7) . . . “the 
destruction of trades which subsist only by sweating is one of the beneficent 
results which the minimum wage is expressly devised to accomplish . . . the 
loss of employment and the bankruptcy of the parasitic trades which the 
enactment of a Minimum Wage Law might involve would be blessings in a 
very thin disguise” (pp.12, 13). 
An identical argument is made today by many on the left (see section 5).  And the Webbs 
(1897 p.780) likened any decline in the sweated trades due to them having to pay higher 
wages as equivalent to the consequences of a withdrawal of the then “bounty” on sugar 
production: “when the bounty is withdrawn . . . the available capital and labor is 
redistributed over the nation’s industry in a more profitable way . . . The effective 
enforcement of a National Minimum of conditions of employment would be equivalent to 
a simple withdrawal of a bounty.  We should, therefore, expect to see a shrinkage in these 
trades.  But there would be at least a corresponding expansion in others”. 
 
The unemployed individuals would gradually decline in number through retirement, 
death or because they had been sent to “disciplined colonies . . . cured, reformed or 
trained as far as possible” (p.13).  In the bulk of economic activity there would be no loss 
of jobs.  Rather “there would be a gradual growth in the national dividend [income] 
arising from the greater power of production due to the increase in physical efficiency” 
(p.19). 
 
e. Inspection and compliance 
 
The Fabians believed that a strong inspectorate would cause most employers to abide by 
the proposed NMW.  They argued that this was the case in Australia, except for the 
Chinese.  Migrants were not thought to cause a special compliance problem although the 
life style of Jewish immigrants did not find favour.  And in what can only be interpreted 
as either Fabian control and meddling tendencies or remarkable prescience, depending on 
 46
your viewpoint, the tract argued for the rigorous enforcement of similar labour standards 
abroad. 
 
Inspection was held to be vital: 
“That there would be a great deal of friction aroused by the minute 
inspection, especially of the wage books, required by the law, is highly 
probable . . . when the first horror of the shock caused by State interference 
in the cash nexus is over, the better employers will heartily welcome the 
means of ridding themselves of the competition of those who employ 
parasitic labour” (p.18) 
This belief that near full compliance was possible stemmed from studying state 
intervention in wage setting in Australia (Macrosty 1897) where it was stated that wage 
rates set by boards in, for example, “baking, clothing, boot making, shirt-making and the 
underclothes trade . . . have given general satisfaction” (p.7).  But this was not so in the 
furniture trade where: 
“. . . certain sections are in the hands of the Chinese whose idea of 
honouring Factory Acts of this kind is to contravene them.  Though 
collusion between Chinese masters and their Chinese workpeople to outwit 
the inspector in matters of wages and hours was glaringly obvious, the 
cunning of the yellow man was too often superior to that of the 
representative of the law when it became a question of securing legal proof 
that the regulations had been broken. . . the furniture trade suffers from the 
blight of yellow labor” (pp.7, 8). 
As always, the Fabians had a solution to this non-compliance: 
“no provision appears to be made for punishing the men as well as the 
employers in a case of collusion” (p.8). 
This is certainly a novel suggestion: not only do you get a wage below the legal minimum, 
but you get punished as well!  It is hard to think of many examples where such joining of 
the employer and worker in instances of non-compliance with regulations occurs.  One 
example is in horseracing.  If a trainer instructs the jockey that the horse is not to run on 
its merits – in order to set up a betting coup in a subsequent race – and the jockey 
complies with the instruction, the trainer, jockey and horse all suffer very severe penalties 
if the non-trier is spotted (HRA 2006, rules 155-157). 
 
Presently the incidence of non-compliance is higher among migrant than local labour, 
especially migrants with poor English.  Similarly, such migrants were commonly thought 
to contribute to the prevalence of sweating in the 1880s and 1890s.  But the Fabians 
disagreed and produced statistics which “dispose of the idea that sweating can be 
prevented by prohibiting the immigration of pauper aliens” (Fabian Society 1894 p.6).  
Nevertheless they were concerned about: 
“foreign paupers, especially Jews from the Polish districts of Russia, 
Germany and Austria. . . The evil effect of the Jew’s occupation lies in the 
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characteristics which render him a fit subject for the pestilential conditions 
of home-work: he overcrowds whole districts with his habit of living in 
misery; and his ingenuity has positively created or organised new industries 
to suit the circumstances” (pp6, 7). 
Essentially the Fabians were arguing that, though they did not care for the way of life of 
immigrant Jews, such workers were making the best of their circumstances with energy 
and ingenuity.  The present debate concerning migrant labour from the EU accession 
countries, particularly the impact on wages, precisely mirrors this same debate a century 
ago. 
 
Just as there is concern in the west today about some imports from Asia – where labour 
standards and regulations are held to be lower – so there was when the national minimum 
wage was first proposed: 
“Under a Minimum Wage Law the manufacture of goods in England under 
sweated or parasitic conditions becomes unlawful, and by inference the sale 
of such goods ought to be made a breach of the law in the same sense as 
selling illicit whiskey.  Therefore, it follows from a Minimum Wage Law that 
the importation of goods made under sweated conditions abroad must be 
prohibited.  The difficulty of deciding what is the foreign equivalent of 
sweating, and the impossibility in many cases of tracing the foreign goods 
through all the processes of their manufacture, are obstacles to the complete 
enforcement of such regulations, but this is not sufficient reason for 
abandoning the attempt” (p.18). 
The Fabian proposal again parallels the debate a century later.  Now, unions and 
employers argue for tariffs, quotas and boycotts of cheaper goods from countries where 
labour standards are either less rigorous than in the west or unenforced.  Then, the 
Fabians wanted their inspectors in every corner of the globe on the pain of prohibiting 
imports produced by low paid labour.  But, for once, they were less sanguine than usual 
that full enforcement of anti-sweating regulations was possible. 
 
f. Interaction of NMW and the social security and tax system 
 
Our present NMW interacts with the social security and tax system to simultaneously 
achieve two goals (Treasury 2006a).  First, the NMW takes no account of family 
circumstances which, instead, are recognised through the system of tax credits.  But, 
second, the NMW puts a floor on wages in order to limit the burden on the Exchequer of 
these credit payments.  The Fabians similarly recognised that family circumstances differ 
and that Exchequer funds are limited. 
 
Consider the discussion of widows with children (recall that the Fabian proposal was for 
a lower female than male NMW): 
 48
“. . . in addition to doing her industrial work [she] has to be both father and 
mother to a family. . . A minimum wage alone cannot rescue her, though it 
alone can make her rescue possible.  The only way of meeting her case is to 
give her, as a matter of right, sufficient existence from public funds to 
enable her . . . to make up her income to the standard of heads of families . . . 
Without such a [NMW] law, the widows allowance would be used to 
cheapen her labour” (pp.10, 11). 
Thus it was proposed that the social security system would, via the widows’ allowance, 
top up the employment earnings.  While our present tax credit system is better calibrated 
to particular family circumstances than a basic widow’s allowance the principle is the 
same. 
 
In the eighteenth century the system of alleviating poverty was largely based on ad hoc 
outdoor relief (although the system varied greatly by area) such that the parish provided 
extra income raised from local property tax.  This was formalised somewhat by the 
spread of the Speenhamland (a parish in Berkshire) system after 1795 where out-relief 
was based on a declared scale that took account of the price of bread, the number of a 
man’s dependents and his income.  According to the Fabians the consequence of this 
system was that: 
“Wages went down;outdoor relief went up; and employers got labour at the 
expense of rates” (p.11). 
Indeed the Webbs (1897 p.426) argued that “the employer is, in effect, receiving a 
bounty”.  This is confirmed by Hunt (1981) our leading labour historian of the period: 
“Employers, knowing the parish would provide the necessary supplement, were alleged 
to be progressively reducing wages, and thus accelerating the pauperisation of the labour 
force and leaving no place for the self-respecting labourer who was eager to work for a 
living wage” (p.132).  The controversial 1834 Poor Law Reform Act largely replaced 
such outdoor relief by indoor relief, forcing the able-bodied poor into workhouses.  The 
tract argues that, instead, the sensible social reform would have been to maintain outdoor 
relief but 
“. . . would have placed the workers behind the bulwark of a legal minimum 
wage” (p.11). 
The Fabian argument again anticipates one rationale advanced for the NMW in the 1990s.  
In the decade prior to the establishment of the Low Pay Commission wage inequality rose 
and, simultaneously, expenditure on tax credits (family credits and family income 
supplement) rose ten-fold.  It was held that the Exchequer was subsidising employers 
through the provision of these in-work benefits and that such subsidies and the associated 
Exchequer burden would be constrained by the introduction of a NMW. 
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g. The NMW and the Living Wage 
 
In London and various US cities (Gerther 2006) recent ordinances have established so-
called living wages for city employees and contractors providing goods and services to 
the public authority.  Typically the campaigns also target prominent private sector 
businesses, banks for example, to encourage or cajole them to also pay the living wage.  
The notion of a living wage is slippery.  It takes no account of family circumstances, 
assumptions concerning benefits (e.g. tax credit, housing and council tax benefit) are 
often arbitrary, and normally a somewhat fanciful amount is added to raise the living 
wage above a poverty threshold wage.  For example in London in 2006, after taking state 
benefits into account, the poverty threshold wage, based on living costs to support a low 
cost but acceptable living standard, is put at £6.16 an hour.  Then an arbitrary 15% is 
added to produce a London living wage of £7.05 (see Greater London Authority 2006).  
The Church of England (Commission on Urban Life 2006) has also endorsed the living 
wage. 
 
While the concept of a living wage is a bit fragile it has a long pedigree.  Fair Wage 
Resolution (FWRs) were introduced in 1891 in an attempt to limit unfair competition for 
government contracts based on undercutting pay and terms of conditions of employment 
established by collective agreements (Metcalf 1981 chapter 5).  As the 1906 Fabian tract 
put it: 
“In spite of the protests of old-fashioned economists against the legal 
regulation of wages, the state, both central and municipal, has begun to act 
on the principle that no sweating or underpayment must be allowed in its 
direct or indirect service” (p.3). 
The document describes, for example, the operation of FWRs by the London County 
Council in the construction, tailoring and window cleaning occupations.  Mayor 
Livingstone’s London Living Wage is but an echo of distant municipal policy, although 
those workers benefiting from the present living wage resolutions are unlikely to suffer 
the offsets of their counterparts a century ago: 
“the tailoring contractor to London County Council will pay the minimum 
rate for the Council work; but it is understood that the worker who is given 
a park-keepers’ suit to make up is compelled to balance the advantage in 
wages accruing therefrom by taking a certain quantity of other work from 
her employer’s private customers at a far lower rate of pay than the County 
Council’s minimum” (p.4). 
Fair Wage Resolutions had solid foundations in that they used as their benchmark a wage 
set by collective bargaining.  By contrast, the living wage is more subjective. 
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Neither the Webbs (1911 edition) nor the 1906 Fabian Tract believed that the minimum 
wage they were proposing was equivalent to a living wage.  For the Webbs the minimum 
wage was based on: 
“healthy subsistence . . . [it] would be determined by practical enquiry as to 
the cost of food, clothing and shelter physiologically necessary to prevent 
bodily deterioration.  Such a minimum would be low . . . it would not at all 
correspond with the conception of a “Living Wage” formed by the cotton 
operatives or coalminers” (p.775). 
Similarly the 1906 tract suggested that the NMW be based on the subsistence 
needs of a family with three children. 
 
The successful culmination of the campaign for a minimum wage, at least in the worst of 
the sweated industries, marked by the 1909 Trade Boards Act spurred on demands for a 
living wage.  Philip Snowden MP wrote a whole book (1912) advocating state 
intervention to set a living wage yet he was nowhere prepared to define it.  Rather a 
living wage “expresses a belief, a conviction, a demand . . . it is not to be expressed in 
concrete terms.  It is not the Thirty Shillings a week which was demanded in the 
resolution moved in the House of Commons on 29 May 1911 on behalf of the Labour 
Party and the Trades Union Congress” (pp.3, 4).  Although Snowden even quotes Pope 
Leo XIII as a supporter “who, by a Living Wage, meant sufficient to support a frugal and 
steady workman” he described any attempt at defining the idea as “futile, for no 
definition can meet one criticism without laying itself open to new ones” (p.5) but he did 
believe that it would “vary as between trade and trade, between locality and locality” 
(p.6).  Essentially, then as now, the living wage is best viewed as a rallying cry to boost 
the pay of those towards the bottom of the wage league table.  Indeed, in the end 
Snowden settled for the trade boards: “The most promising method of securing a living 
wage for all workers seems to be by the extension of the Trade Boards Act” (p.133).  He 
certainly got his wish: by 1953 4 million workers, 1-in-5, were in sectors covered by the 
66 Wages Councils (re-named ex-Trade Boards) plus the two agricultural wage boards.  
In the second half of the twentieth century these councils decayed and were finally 
abolished in 1993.  But since the introduction of the NMW in 1999 history is repeating 
itself as local and sector campaigns are mounted for a living wage above the NMW.   
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
British workers have now been covered by a NMW for eight years and the LPC is a 
decade old.  It is a good time to evaluate the impact of the NMW on pay and employment 
because: 2006 was the centenary of the first call for a NMW; recent hikes in the NMW 
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exceed the growth in average pay; and the composition of the LPC is about to radically 
alter (section 1). 
 
The NMW has raised the real and relative pay of low paid workers, tempered wage 
inequality and contributed to the narrowing of the gender wage gap.  When it was first 
introduced in 1999 it covered around 1.2 million workers, but recent jumps in the NMW 
– above average earnings growth – mean that now some 2 million workers directly 
receive higher pay than they would have done without the NMW (section 2). 
 
Standard economic theory posits that, given this impact on wages, employment will fall.  
The extent of any fall turns on the elasticity of the demand for labour with respect to the 
wage which depends on: the elasticity of substitution; the elasticity of demand for the 
product; labour costs in total costs; and the elasticity of supply of other factors.  But 
employment falls may be tempered because of, inter alia, an uncovered sector, non-
compliance, monopsony – labour market frictions, efficiency wage effects and offsets.  
There are sound theoretical reasons for analysing hours of work as well as employment .  
Employment effects of the NMW have been investigated by: examining aggregate 
employment and shares of employment by industry and age; individuals’ employment 
experience; and employment changes across both geographic areas and firms (section 3). 
 
Trends in aggregate employment and sector shares were unaffected by the introduction 
and uprating of the NMW.  Similarly there is little or no evidence of employment effects 
in the many studies of individuals, areas and firms.  But there is a suggestion of a modest 
impact on hours of work (section 4).  This evidence points to Alan Walters writing 
“obvious nonsense” rather than those who were more sanguine and circumspect 
concerning employment effects. 
 
Twelve possible reasons for small or non-existent employment effects of the NMW were 
examined (section 5).  Two can definitely be ruled out: the NMW was not set below the 
previous competitive wage and coverage is virtually complete.  Five possible 
explanations, in order of increasing likelihood are, first, for many workers a NMW job is 
a stepping stone to a higher wage more secure job.  Second, employment effects may 
only emerge in the long run.  Third, the employment effects of the larger relative rise in 
the NMW 2003-06 have, as yet, been insufficiently studied.  Fourth, there is incomplete 
compliance with the NMW, the extent of which is unknown but is almost certainly 
growing.  But for this non-compliance employment in the non-complying sector would 
be lower because some firms would close.  Fifth, a key reason for this non-compliance is 
illegal collusion between the employer and worker to boost the amount of tax credit 
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received by an individual worker – an offset to the cost of the NMW courtesy of the 
exchequer. 
 
The five most probable explanations concern the productivity-prices-profits nexus, hours 
reductions and labour market frictions.  There is (weak) evidence that some firms 
affected by the NMW intensified effort, altered work organisation and raised their 
investment in human capital.  Where labour costs increased some of this increase was 
passed on via higher prices: the relative price of minimum wage-produced consumer 
services rose relative to the RPI.  Profits in firms employing low wage workers fell 
relative to other firms and at macro level the share of profit in national income has been 
lower since the NMW than its average since 1980.  Profits took some of the strain.  Next, 
there is some evidence that firms adjusted hours rather than workers.  Finally labour 
market frictions – imperfect information, mobility costs and tastes – give the employer 
some market power which implies a NMW does not automatically reduce employment 
 
A remarkable, and sadly neglected, Fabian tract proposed a NMW in 1906.  This brief 
document covered most of the issues analysed here including pay setting; competitive 
versus monopsonistic approaches to employment levels; compliance including the matter 
of labour standards abroad; and the interaction between the NMW and the social security 
system.  It was also a creature of its time: it advocated a higher NMW for men than for 
women; it expressed tart views on Chinese and Jewish workers and employers; and it 
suggested that some unemployment resulting from a NMW would be beneficial (section 
6). 
 
The NMW has had an important impact on the distribution of pay and national income 
(equity) without offsetting adverse employment effects (efficiency).  Consider the 
D50/D10 wage differential.  It was shown in section 2 that since 1999 the NMW alone 
has reversed half the growth in inequality that occurred in the previous two decades.  This 
is a remarkable achievement because there are so many forces working in the opposite 
direction to increase wage inequality.  These include the huge increase in the supply of 
less skilled labour caused by immigration, declining trade union density and collective 
bargaining coverage and greater use of performance related pay.  The NMW has directly 
cut the D50/D10 differential by 5 percentage points.  Immigration, waning union 
influence and altered payment systems would have increased the D50/D10 differential by 
at least 4 percentage points since 1999 but for the NMW.  Thus the total impact of the 
NMW on D50/D10 is some 9 points – a very large effect.  In addition the NMW is 
associated with a declining share of profit in national income and a corresponding rise in 
labour’s share.  Bank of England data show that since the introduction of the NMW the 
share of profits in national income has always been below its historic average since 1980. 
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It seems safe to conclude that the LPC, via its evidence-based approach advocated in the 
Fabian tract a century ago, has raised the real and relative wage of low paid workers 
without adverse employment consequences.  The NMW has, as Spender (1912) pleaded, 
finally set a Plimsoll line for labour.10 
                                                 
10 Samuel Plimsoll proposed a loading line on ships above which a hull must not be allowed to submerge at the dock. 
This was made compulsory in the 1876 Merchant Shipping Act.  Before then many “coffin ships” were over insured 
and overloaded and regularly sank at sea.  For a riveting biography of Samuel Plimsoll see Jones (2006). 
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Table 1 
Increase in hourly earnings at time of introduction of National Minimum Wage 
 
All aged 22 plus who 
remained in same job 
Median earnings 
October 1998 
£ 
Median earnings 
October 1999 
£ 
 
Earning less than  
£3.60 in 1998 
 
Earning £3.60 or 
more in 1998 
 
 
3.16 
 
 
7.36 
 
3.65 
 
 
7.70 
 
Source: LPC (2001 table 3.3) using British Household Panel Survey data 1998, 1999. 
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Table 2 
NMW bite and the gender pay gap 
 
 
Adult NMW as a percentage of gross hourly earnings 
excluding overtime for all aged 18 and over 
Gender pay gap for full-
time employees (female 
hourly earnings as a 
percentage of male 
hourly earnings) 
 Date 
(April) 
Adult 
NMW 
Lowest 
decile 
Lowest 
quartile 
Median Mean Median Mean 
1998 na 16.4 20.4
1999 £3.60 87.0 68.3 47.6 36.7 15.7 19.7
2000 £3.60 83.3 65.7 46.2 35.3 13.8 19.0
2001 £3.70 82.2 64.8 45.2 34.2 14.0 19.0
2002 £4.10 86.7 69.0 48.1 36.0 13.5 19.2
2003 £4.20 84.0 67.5 47.5 35.7 12.7 18.7
ASHE without 
supplementary 
information 
2004 £4.50 87.2 69.4 48.5 36.7 12.1 17.1
2004 £4.50 87.5 70.0 49.0 37.4 12.2 16.7
2005 £4.85 91.0 72.9 51.1 38.6 11.1 16.5
ASHE with 
supplementary 
information 2006 £5.05 91.2 72.8 51.1 38.6 10.8 16.8
Predicted bite 2007 £5.35 92.8 74.4 52.1 39.3 - -
 
Source: ONS, Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) without supplementary information, 1998-2004, ASHE with supplementary information, 2004-6.  
Notes: (i) There is a change of definition in ASHE in 2004 which improved the coverage of low paid workers.  (ii) The data for 2007 assume that lowest decile, 
lowest quartile, median and mean hourly earnings grow by the average earnings forecasted by the Treasury Panel of Independent Forecasts, viz 4.2%.  (iii) The 
gender pay gap data refer to workers on adult rates whose pay was not affected by absence. 
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Table 3 
Uprated value of the introductory adult NMW: actual NMW compared to what it might have been 
 
Figures in £ per hour AEI 
(including 
bonuses) 
AEI 
(excluding 
bonuses) 
RPI RPIX CPI Actual 
NMW 
April 1999 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.60 
October 2000 3.85 3.83 3.76 3.73 3.66 3.70 
October 2001 4.03 4.03 3.83 3.82 3.71 4.10 
October 2002 4.18 4.18 3.88 3.89 3.75 4.20 
October 2003 4.34 4.33 4.00 4.00 3.80 4.50 
October 2004 4.50 4.52 4.12 4.09 3.85 4.85 
October 2005 4.69 4.69 4.24 4.18 3.94 5.05 
October 2006 4.88 4.86 4.34 4.28 4.02 5.35 
 
Source: ONS.  The Adult NMW uprated using various quarterly measures of average earnings (GB) and prices (UK).  AEI including bonuses (ONS code LNMQ) 
and excluding bonuses (ONS code JQDW); RPI (ONS code CHAW), RPIX (ONS code CHMK) and CPI (ONS code D7BT). 
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Table 4 
Total GB employee jobs and employee jobs in low paying sectors 1999-2006 
 
 
% share Sector Employee jobs 
March 1999 
(thousands) 
Employee jobs 
March 2006 
(thousands) 
Absolute change 
in number of jobs 
1999-2006 
(thousands) 
1999 2006 
All 
 
All low paying sectors below 
 
 Retail 
 Hospitality 
 Social care 
 Cleaning 
 Agriculture 
 Security 
 Textile, clothing, footwear 
 Hairdressing 
 24,206 
 
 6,311 
 
 2,525 
 1,557 
 973 
 435 
 271 
 128 
 306 
 98 
 25,918 
 
 6,698 
 
 2,818 
 1,743 
 1,101 
 434 
 204 
 158 
 127 
 112 
 1,712 
 
 387 
 
 293 
 186 
 128 
 -1 
 -67 
 30 
 -179 
 14 
100 
 
26.1 
 
10.4 
6.4 
4.0 
1.7 
1.1 
0.5 
1.3 
0.4 
100 
 
25.9 
 
10.9 
6.7 
4.2 
1.7 
0.8 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
 
Notes:   
a. Data are quarterly, not seasonally adjusted.  They are collected from employer records and 
therefore include multiple job holding. 
b. The social care sector covers both residential social care and non-residential social care. 
c. It should be noted that the employee jobs series produces a higher employment figure than the 
corresponding Labour Force Survey figure because the LFS does not account for temporary 
foreign workers, some armed forces, workers living in communal establishments and third 
and subsequent employee jobs; the LFS also has some non-response and proxy response 
errors (see Walling and Heap 2006). 
 
Sources: 
 Office for National Statistics, Employee Jobs Series, Great Britain. 
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Table 5 
Introduction of the National Minimum Wage 1999: employment effects 
 
Author Unit of 
observation etc 
Data Employment 
indicator 
Wage indicator Control variables Results 
 
• difference-in-difference 
”insignificantly different from zero 
in all four demographic groups 
(male and female adults and youths) 
and all three datasets” 
• wage gap 
implied elasticities (all ns) 
 
 
 
Adult 
men 
Young 
men 
Adult 
women 
Young 
women 
LFS 
BHPS 
NES 
.005 
.026 
.005 
.047 
- 
.004 
-.003 
.024 
-.001 
.038 
- 
.036 
 
Stewart (2004a) 
 
individuals 
UK 
 
• Labour Force Survey 
(matched)  
n=54165 
• BHPS 1994-99 
n= 16796 
• New Earnings Survey 
1994-99 
n=537,697 
 
Employment 
probabilities 
• difference-in-
difference 
• wage gap 
 
hourly pay 
• LFS 
weekly gross ÷ 
actual hours or usual 
hours 
• BHPS 
weekly gross ÷ 
normal hours 
• NES 
hourly pay 
calculated 
excluding 
overtime hours 
and earnings 
 
 
• LFS/BHPS 
age completed 
highest qual 
lm experience 
current tenure 
PT/FT 
marital status 
ethnic status 
perm/temp job 
public/private 
health problems 
real hourly wage 
region 
yr/month 
• NES 
fewer controls 
 
 
  
Stewart & 
Swaffield (2004) 
individuals 
UK 
aged 22-64 
• LFS 
1997-2000 
n= approx 21000 
• NES 
1994-2000 
n= approx 190,000 
• basic hours 
• total hours 
Hourly pay 
as Stewart (2004a) 
above 
• LFS 
year, month 
region 
FT/PT 
tenure 
marital status 
ethnic group 
public/private 
health 
lm exp 
education 
• NES 
year, month 
region 
FT/PT 
tenure 
 
 
re total effect 
i.e. initial plus lagged 
NES 
redn. In both basic and total hours of 1-2 per week 
LFS 
higher than cut of 1-2 re men, lower re women 
“MW led to a reduction in paid working hours of 
both male and female low wage workers” 
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Connolly & 
Gregory (2002) 
individual 
women  
aged 22-59 
UK 
• BHPS 1994-2000 
n=2000-2600 pa 
• NES Panel 1999-2001 
n=5600-63000 pa 
average hours 
• difference-in-
difference 
BHPS 
• basic hours 
• actual hours 
NES 
• actual hours 
hourly pay 
as Stewart (2004a) 
above 
• NES 
age 
real wage 
job mobility 
occupation 
• BHPS 
NES plus 
ed quals 
demographics 
 
 
both with / without controls 
• no sig. difference between the groups 
• but 3 year effect more negative than 1 
year (albeit ns) 
Robinson & 
Wadsworth (2005) 
individuals 
UK 
• LFS 
approx 22000 individuals 
of whom treatment plus 
control =3600 
1998-99 
• probability of 
second job 
holding 
• hours of work 
- first job 
- second job 
hourly pay 
weekly pay ÷ actual 
hours 
- below NMW 
- wage gap 
industry 
marital status 
ethnicity 
perm/temp 
firm size 
job tenure 
age/no. of kids 
 
 
 
• no significant impact on change in 
probability of second job holding for those 
initially below NMW cf control group 
• for workers with 2 jobs in 1998: little 
affect on hours worked in second or main 
job 
 
Stewart (2002) 140 areas of GB • Pay 
New Earnings Survey 
(NES) 
• Employment 
LFS 
Annual Business Inquiry 
NES 
sample varies from 
- areas 140 
- individuals 789,141 
 
 
 
• regression 
change in employment as function of % of 
workers below minimum 
• difference-in-difference 
compare employment changes in high wage 
and low wage areas of country 
both above done using data at level of 
- area 
- individual 
when individual data: 
age 
gender 
PT/FT 
%<12 months 
• virtually all estimates ns 
• e.g. even when focus on high risk groups 
like youths, women and unskilled 
“all estimates [of the employment effects] at 
both area and individual level are insignificant 
and the great majority are positive” 
Galindo-Rueda 
and Pereira (2004) 
 459 areas 
8 low wage sectors 
1997-2001 
• net change in 
number of 
establishments 
• employment 
change 
propn paid below 
initial NMW in 1998 
in area/sector 
sector 
district 
year 
• all sectors except textiles had net increases 
in no. of estabs and employment 
• but such growth lower in areas where 
NMW had higher bite 
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• no correlation between impact of NMW 
and probability of home closure 
• impact of 1% change in NMW in range 
360p to 400p 
 
Machin, Manning 
& Rahman (2003) 
 
Firms 
 
575 care homes 
 
• probability of 
closure 98/01 
• change in 
employment 98/99 
• change in total hours 
98/99 
 
• propn paid below 
NMW 
ave=32.3% 
• wage gap of care 
home 
ave=3.9% 
 
% female 
% nurse qual. 
avg age 
change occupancy rate 
% LA residents 
County/month 
wage 
indicator 
change in 
employment 
change in 
total hours 
      -  initial % 
below NMW 
-  wage gap 
-.13 
 
-.29 
-.39 
 
-.25 
(ns) 
         
Draca et al. (2005) 
 
 
Firms FAME 
2268 firms 
• probability of 
closure 1999-2002 
• employment change 
1999-2002 
Low wage firm 
cf 
middle wage firm 
industry 
region 
k: sales 
firm age 
education 
% union 
% PT 
% female 
no correlation between impact of NMW on 
labour costs and 
• exit rate 1999-2002 
• employment change 1999-2002 
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Table 6 
Uprating of National Minimum Wage: employment effects 
 
Author Unit of 
observation etc 
Data Employment 
indicator 
Wage 
indicator 
Control variables Result 
 
Stewart 
(2004b) 
 
 
upratings 
• 2000 
• 2001 
individuals 
UK 
 
Matched 
Labour Force Survey 
2000 n=51880 
2001 n=37287 
 
Employment 
probability difference-
in-difference 
 
Hourly pay 
Weekly gross ÷ actual 
hours or usual hours 
 
as Stewart (2004a) 
 
• all estimates insignificantly different 
from zero 
• most estimates positive 
Dickens & Draca 
(2005) 
 
uprating 
2003 
individuals 
UK 
Matched 
Labour Force Survey 
April-Sept 2003 cf 
Oct 03-Mar 04 
Difference-in-difference 
• employment 
retentions 
• employment inflows 
Actual hourly pay 
(preferred)  
also as Stewart above 
(not preferred) 
similar to Stewart 
(2004a) 
• employment retention 
- all adults 
  treatment group retention rate cut from 
93% to 91% by uprating ns (t=0.94) 
- separate adult M/F, all /youths all ns, 
most close to zero 
• job entry 
no significant difference between 
control/treatment groups 
 
Jones et al (2006) 1999-2005 ASHE panel  
approx 135000 individuals
1 year transitions 
(e.g. 99/00, 04/05) 
 
exit from employment not low paid 
low paid 
(defined as at or below 
NMW) 
- exits risen monotonically 1999-2005 
exits absolutely higher for low paid 
increase in exits higher for not low paid 
10% increase in 
change in 
employment 
Machin & Wilson 
(2004) 
Firms 
2001 uprating 
180 care homes 
south coast 
change in employment 
2001/2 
• propn paid below 
new NMW 
• wage gap 
% female 
% nurse qual. 
Ave age 
% LA residents 
county 
- initial % 
below NMW 
- wage gap 
-.042 (ns) 
 
-.783 (ns) 
 
 
item 
 
 
mean scores 
 
 
Mason et al. 
(2006) 
 
 
2003 uprating 
 
 
17067 
small businesses 
 
 
anticipated response to 2003 uprating 
• 5-point scale 
1 (significant decrease) to 5 
   (significant increase) 
• 3 – no change 
 
 
region 
employment 
basic hours 
overtime hours 
2.94 
2.92 
2.90 
        
Metcalf 
(this paper) 
1998-2004 1126 
private sector workplaces 
WERS panel 
change in employment % workforce below 
£3.50 in 1998 
- no association re 
• closure rates 
• change in employment 
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Experian 
(2006) 
1995-2004 retail/hospitality 
110 observations by 
region 
ASHE (pay) 
ONS employment (jobs) 
change in employ in 
region relative to UK 
increase in wage bill in 
region relative to UK 
region 
industry 
• retail : no association 
• hospitality : negative association by 
small elasticity -.04 
  63
Table 7 
Employment change 1998-2004 by percent of workforce 
earning below £3.50 per hour in 1998 
 
 Employment change 1998 – 2004 (%) 
Percent of 1998 
workforce earning 
below £3.50 
Closed 
down 
more 
than -25 
-5 to 
-25 
+ 
- 4.9 
+ 5 to 
+ 25 
more 
than 
+25 
Total 
Zero n % 
156 
23.3 
158 
23.5 
89 
13.3 
47 
7.0 
82 
12.2 
138 
20.6 
670 
100 
         
0.1 to 5.0 n % 
30 
16.0 
55 
29.4 
26 
13.9 
11 
5.9 
26 
13.9 
39 
20.9 
187 
100 
         
5.01 to 25.0 n % 
25 
16.1 
34 
21.9 
22 
14.2 
11 
7.1 
29 
18.7 
34 
21.9 
155 
100 
         
25.01 + n % 
24 
21.1 
23 
20.2 
22 
19.3 
10 
8.8 
9 
7.9 
26 
22.8 
114 
100 
         
Total n % 
235 
20.9 
270 
24.0 
159 
14.1 
79 
7.0 
146 
13.0 
237 
21.0 
1126 
100 
 
Notes:  
(i) The top entry in a cell is the number of workplaces and the second is the row percentage.  For 
example of 114 workplaces with more than 25% of employees paid below £3.50 in 1998, 24 
closed down between 1998 and 2004, equivalent to 21.2% of this group. 
(ii) Sample is workplaces that had 10 or more employees in 1998 and were in the private sector. 
 
Source: Workplace Employment Relations Survey Panel 1998-2004, available from www.data-
archive.ac.uk study number 5294. 
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Table 8 
Impact of NMW on productivity 
 
Author Sample Method Definition of productivity Controls Result 
 
Forth and 
O’Mahony 
(2003) 
 
• 183 industries 
 
• 7 low paying industries 
 
 1998-2000 
cf 
1995-1998 
 
• wage bill impact of NMW 
cf productivity change 
• productivity change 
 
in each case cf before/after 
introduction of NMW 
 
• gross real value added per hour 
• sometimes disagg to 
-  K:L ratio 
-  TFP 
 
skill mix 
 
• +ve ns correlation between wage 
bill (bite) impact of NMW and 
growth in labour productivity 
• correlation stronger 1995-98 than 
1998-2000 but never significant 
• similar findings for TFP and K:L 
ratio 
• evidence of acceleration in labour 
productivity growth in textiles, 
security and hairdressing post 
1998 but not in other low paying 
sectors 
 
Draca et al. 
(2006) 
378 UK firms 
over 6 years 
2268 observations 
FAME data 
difference-in-difference 
cf “policy on” (1999-2002) 
with “policy off” (1996-99) 
cf low wage firms with higher 
wage firms 
sales/employment industry (1-digit) 
region 
capital:sales ratio 
% graduates 
% union, %IT, % 
female by 3-digit 
industry 
 
during “policy on” the gain in 
productivity was 5.4% higher in the 
treatment than in the control group, but 
ns 
Galindo-Ruedo 
and Pereira 
(2004) 
matched 
• firms from Annual Business 
Inquiry 
• workers from NES 
• manufacturing: approx 800 firms 
1994-2001, 6000 observations 
• services approx 800 firms 
1999-2001, 3000 observations 
difference-in-difference 
• treatment group 
- services: at least 30% of 
workers paid < £4 hour 
1998, = 16% of sample 
- mfc: at least 5% of 
workers paid < £4 hour 
1998 = 16% of sample 
• control group: other firms 
analyse how productivity 
measure alters at time of 
introduction of NMW 
 
 
• labour productivity 
gross output/employment 
• total factor productivity 
3-digit industry 
dummy 
firm dummy 
• labour productivity 
relative increase of 11% in 
treatment group cf control group 
• tfp 
no associations 
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Galindo-Ruedo 
and Pereira 
(2004) 
matched 
• firms from Annual Business 
Inquiry 
• industry/region cell from NES 
• services, approx 
5600 firms in treatment 
5000 firms in control 
20,000 observations 
• production, approx 
1000 firms in treatment 
8600 in control 
32000 observations 
 
difference-in-difference 
• treatment group 
firms must be in 
industry/region cell where 
at least 10% of 1998 
workers paid < NMW 
times(1.05) 
• control group: other firms 
 
gross output/employment firm fixed effect • services 
increase of 6-17% at intro of 
NMW 
• production 
no association 
Machin et al 
(2003) 
 
486-586 UK care homes difference-in-difference 
introduction of NMW 
cf across homes according to 
• initial fraction < NMW 
• initial wage gap 
 
• residents per worker hour 
• change in worker effort 
because of NMW 
% female 
% nursing 
qualification 
% care assistants 
average age 
occupancy rate 
% paid for by LA 
county 
response month 
 
all associations + ve 
e.g. 10% increase in wage gap linked 
to 9% increase in effort 
but none significant 
Georgiadis 
(2006) 
135-183 south coast care homes difference-in-difference 
introduction / 2001 uprating 
• initial fraction < NMW 
• initial wage gap 
• no. of beds per employee/hour 
• no. of residents per 
employee/hour 
• ratio of employees 
with/without nursing quals 
• worker effort 
• supervision intensity 
% female 
% nursing 
qualification 
% care assistants 
average age 
occupancy rate 
% paid for by LA 
country 
response month 
 
all associations ns except 
-ve association between wage gap and 
supervision intensity 
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Arulampalam  
et al (2004) 
approx 2500 workers aged 18-60 
BHPS 
1998 wave 8 
2000 wave 10 
difference-in-difference 
• training in 18 months prior 
to/after introduction of 
NMW 
• treatment group: workers 
initially below NMW 
• control group: workers 
initially at NMW and up to 
15% above it 
change in 
• incidence of training 
• intensity (days) of training 
age 
PT 
fixed/temp job 
changed employer 
marital status 
union 
sector 
firm size 
1-digit industry 
local 
unemployment rate 
 
• raw 
 
 incidence intensity 
(days) 
treatment 
control 
.10 to .17 
.28 to .30 
2.3 to 6.5 
5.0 to 4.9 
 
• difference-in-difference 
cf treatment and control 
- training probability increased 
by 8-11% points (sig) 
- training days increased by 10% 
points (sig) 
 
Dickerson 
(2006) 
 
 
approx 49,000 workers aged 18-60 
LFS 
1998, 2000 
difference-in-difference 
• training prior to / after intro 
of NMW 
• treatment and controls as in 
Arulampalam et al. (2004) 
change in receipt of training in 
• last week 
• last 4 weeks 
• last 13 weeks 
experience 
tenure 
public sector 
ethnic group 
industry 
occupation 
estab. Size 
PT/FT 
region 
• 3 training defns, 4 groups of 
workers 
• 9 out of 12 coefficients + ve all 
ns 
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Table 9 
Relative price changes of NMW-produced consumer services 
 
Consumer 
service 
% paid at or 
below NMW 
1998-99 
% point price rise 
relative to RPI 
own-price 
elasticity of 
demand 
% of total 
expenditure 
accounted for by 
NMW households 
 1 2 3 4 
 
All NMW services 
Home cleaning 
Road travel, minicabs 
Hotels 
Canteen meals 
Takeaway food 
Pub drinks 
Restaurant meals 
Dry cleaning, laundry 
Hairdressing services 
 
 
- 
36.6 
54.2 
28.7 
34.1 
57.8 
52.8 
41.1 
28.0 
39.3 
 
0.8* 
2.2* 
1.5* 
1.4* 
0.7* 
0.4* 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
 
- 
+0.36 
-0.83* 
+0.75 
-2.77* 
-0.95* 
-2.61* 
-0.34* 
-2.67* 
-0.19 
 
- 
2.8 
16.0 
8.2 
17.4 
17.2 
17.7 
12.4 
7.0 
9.2 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Column 1 from LFS.  Wadsworth ranked the sectors according to incidence of low pay in 1998-99.  
Industrial cleaning was also in the top 10 sectors but omitted from the analysis in order to focus on 
consumer services.  Care homes do not appear in this list because there is no price index for care homes. 
 
2. Column 2 from Family Expenditure Survey (monthly observations, annual inflation rate).  Difference-in-
difference estimate pre- (January 1997 to March 1999) and post- (April 1999 to December 2005) NMW; 
control item is RPI.  * means significant at, at least 5%. 
 
3. Column 3 is from FES: own-price elasticity derived from regression of budget share on log of own-price 
index for each month January 1996 to December 2005.  * means significant at at least 5%. 
 
4. Column 4: there are 11.6% NMW households in the FES sample.  They spend disproportionately more on 
some items e.g. canteen meals and disproportionately less on other items e.g. home cleaning. 
 
Source: Wadsworth (2007). 
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Table 10 
Impact of NMW on profit margins 
 
 
Representative sample of UK firms Care home sector 
Author 
Sample 
 
Draca et al. (2006) 
firms registered in UK 
• balanced panel, 342 firms, 2052 observations 
• unbalanced panel, approx 700 firms, 3820 
observations 
Draca et al. (2006) 
469 residential homes 
 
Method 
 
Difference-in-difference 
cf “policy-on” (1999 – 2002) with “policy-off” 
 (1996 – 1999) 
cf low wage firms with higher wage firms 
 
Difference-in-difference 
cf “policy-on” (1999 – 2000) with “policy-off” 
 (1998 – 99) 
cf homes where pre-NMW wage very low with 
 homes already at or near NMW 
 
Definitions 
Pay 
 
 
Profit 
 
 
 
Controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cf low average wage (<£12k pa) with higher 
average wage (12k - £20k pa) firms 
 
Gross profit (prior to deductions for tax, interest 
 and dividends) as fraction of turnover (sales) 
 
 
industry (1-digit) 
region 
firm age 
capital – sales ratio 
% graduates 
% union, % IT, % female by 3-digit SIC 
 
 
Wage gap i.e. by how much pay must increase 
to  fulfil NMW 
 
• total revenue – total costs = gross profit 
• profit margin = gross profit / revenue 
 
 
% female 
% with nursing qualification 
mean age 
% local authority residents 
county, time 
 
Results 
Pay 
 
 
 
 
Profit margin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
change in average wage 1996 – 2001 % 
 higher wage firms 12 
 low wage firms 21 
 
 
low wage cf high wage firms: 
profit margin cf post period with pre-period 
low wage firms, down by  .021 
high wage firms up by .006 
so difference-in-difference = -.027 
(or with controls -.031 to -.042) 
original profit margin .400 
so profit margin fell by 8% to 11% 
 
 
• 38% of workers paid < NMW “pre” 
• 31% of workers paid = NMW “post” 
• pay rose most the larger the initial wage 
gap 
 
 
mean wage gap .04 
elasticity of profit margin wrt wage gap -.60 
so average firm facing reduction in 
 profit margin of .024 
initial profit margin .102 
so profit margin down by 23%
 
 
Notes: There is a (small) problem concerning the calculation of profits for the care home sample. Profits are defined as 
total revenue minus total cost. Total cost is calculated: (wage bill / labour cost share in total cost). An increase in the 
NMW will tend to increase both the numerator and denominator of total cost. But if such an increase in the NMW raises 
the wage bill proportionately more than the fraction labour costs are in total costs then total costs automatically rise and 
profits fall correspondingly. I have worked through some arithmetical examples and this bias is probably not large. 
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Table 11 
Profit and wage shares in national income (%) 
 
 Gross operating 
surplus, all companies 
as share of total GDP 
Gross operating 
surplus of non-
financial corporations 
as share of private 
GDP 
Compensation of 
employees as share of 
GDP 
Compensation of 
employees plus social 
security 
contributions as 
share of total GDP 
 ONS ONS ONS EU 
1997 
1999 
2005 
24.2 
23.4 
22.3 
26.0 
24.3 
23.5 
53.0 
54.2 
55.9 
70.4 
71.8 
73.0 
 
Notes: 
Although these are all official data they need to be treated carefully.  For example profits are measured gross, not 
net of depreciation.  Column 1 does not correct for self-employment or the size of the public sector.  The ONS 
codes are IHXM/YBHA.  Column 2 excludes financial companies from the numerator, but includes them in the 
denominator.  It nets out the public sector but does not correct for self employment.  The ONS codes are CAER / 
(YBHA minus NMRP).  Column 3 takes compensation of workers including social security contributions as a 
percent of GDP.  It does not correct for the size of public sector employment or self employment.  The ONS codes 
are IHXP/YBHA.  Column 4 is all on a per employee basis.  The numerator is pay plus social security contributions.  
It also takes account of self employed workers and imputes their average wage.  The denominator is GDP at factor 
cost. 
 
Sources: 
Office of National Statistics: profitability@ons.gov.uk; European Commission, European Economy Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2004, No.4, table 32. 
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Figure 1 
Increase in adult NMW compared with movements in earnings and prices 
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Figure 2 
Earnings growth 1992–2006 
Increase in Hourly earnings Minus the Increase in Median Earnings by Percentile for Employees 
Aged 22 and Over, UK, 1992-2006 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96
Percentile of the gross hourly earnings excluding overtime distribution (adults aged 22 and over)
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
1992–1997 1998–2006
 
Source: ONS, New Earnings Survey 1992-1997; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) without supplementary information, 1998 and ASHE 
with supplementary information, 2006. Gross hourly earnings excluding overtime. There is a small change of definition in ASHE in 2004 so 
comparisons using identical data definitions between 1998 and 2006 are not possible. We make such a comparison for illustrative purposes.
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Source: ONS. ASHE without supplementary information, 1998 and 2004. ASHE with supplementary information, 2005. Gross hourly earnings 
excluding overtime. There is a change of definition in ASHE in 2004 so comparisons using identical data definitions between 1998 and 2005 
using ASHE are not possible. We make such a comparison for illustrative purposes only. 
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Figure 3 
Gender pay ratio by percentile, 1998-2005 
Female hourly earnings as a percentage of male hourly earnings by 
percentile for adults aged 22 and over, UK, 1998-2005
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Figure 4 
Gross hourly earnings excluding overtime distribution for adults aged 22 and over, UK,  
Spring 1998 
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Figure 5 
Non-oil private sector profit share 
percentage of non-oil private sector final output 
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
1
9
8
0
 
Q
1
1
9
8
0
 
Q
4
1
9
8
1
 
Q
3
1
9
8
2
 
Q
2
1
9
8
3
 
Q
1
1
9
8
3
 
Q
4
1
9
8
4
 
Q
3
1
9
8
5
 
Q
2
1
9
8
6
 
Q
1
1
9
8
6
 
Q
4
1
9
8
7
 
Q
3
1
9
8
8
 
Q
2
1
9
8
9
 
Q
1
1
9
8
9
 
Q
4
1
9
9
0
 
Q
3
1
9
9
1
 
Q
2
1
9
9
2
 
Q
1
1
9
9
2
 
Q
4
1
9
9
3
 
Q
3
1
9
9
4
 
Q
2
1
9
9
5
 
Q
1
1
9
9
5
 
Q
4
1
9
9
6
 
Q
3
1
9
9
7
 
Q
2
1
9
9
8
 
Q
1
1
9
9
8
 
Q
4
1
9
9
9
 
Q
3
2
0
0
0
 
Q
2
2
0
0
1
 
Q
1
2
0
0
1
 
Q
4
2
0
0
2
 
Q
3
2
0
0
3
 
Q
2
2
0
0
4
 
Q
1
2
0
0
4
 
Q
4
2
0
0
5
 
Q
3
2
0
0
6
 
Q
2
Year
N
o
n
-
o
i
l
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
f
i
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
(
p
e
r
 
c
e
n
t
)
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Non-oil private sector profit share Average since 1980
 
Note: Final output is defined as gross value added of the non-oil and gas private sector plus intermediate inputs.  Profits defined as final output minus 
employment compensation, intermediate inputs and alignment adjustments. 
 
Source: Bank of England, Inflation Report, November 2006, chart B. 
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APPENDIX. Impact on the income distribution 
 
The distributional affect of the NMW by household income depends crucially on two 
factors.  First, the sample of households chosen e.g. all households, working age 
households, working age households with at least one person in work.  Second, whether 
or not alterations in income resulting from offsetting benefit reductions and/or tax 
increases are taken into account.  It is surely sensible to focus mainly on the income 
distribution among working families because, by definition, the NMW cannot influence 
the household income in those households where no one is in a job.  Similarly, the NMW 
influences the earnings coming into the household but this, in turn, affects tax and 
national insurance liabilities and benefits received including tax credits and housing 
benefits.  It is therefore appropriate to take marginal deduction rates into account when 
analysing the impact of the NMW on the household income distribution. 
 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies modelled the distributional impact of the 2003 NMW 
uprating from £4.20 to £4.50 using the Family Resources Survey, see table A.1.  Column 
2 reports the impact across all families while column 3 concentrates solely on working 
families.  The marginal deduction rates are applied in both cases.  When the sample is all 
families the percentage gaining in each income decile is an inverted-U shape.  This is 
because many of the poorest families are pensioners or unemployed who will not gain 
from the NMW.  Instead, the gainers tend to be concentrated in deciles 3-6.  The top 
quintile of the distribution also has relatively few households which stand to gain from 
the NMW. 
 
Now focus instead just on the working households in column 3.  For this sample the 
picture is entirely different.  A quarter of households in the bottom quintile gain from the 
NMW and this fraction falls monotonically such that only 1-family-in-25 in the top 
quintile gain.  Other actual or hypothetical increases in the NMW have been modelled by 
Bryan and Taylor (2004) using BHPS and the Treasury (2005, 2006b) using their model.  
Reassuringly, the pattern of results is very similar in each case. 
 
It is not just the percentage of households in each income decile that gain that matters.  
We should also consider by how much their income goes up.  The Treasury (2006b) 
modelled this for working households, taking account of marginal deduction rates, for a 
hypothetical increase of 25p in the NMW in 2007 (i.e. from £5.35 to a notional £5.60).  
The average gain – for the 2.3m (9.3%) households that have any gain – is £4.50 a week.  
But those in the top half of the income distribution, gain absolutely more than this while 
those families in the bottom 40% gain less.  There are three reasons for this.  First, many 
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beneficiaries are in dual-earner households.  For example women living with employed 
men account for two fifths of NMW recipients and a further third consist of young people 
still living with their parents.  Thus 7-out-of-10 affected by the NMW live in dual-earner 
households and these households are not normally in the bottom of the family income 
distribution.  Second, such dual-earner households are more likely than other households 
to have at least one full-time worker.  Third, lower income families face higher marginal 
deduction rates, particularly on housing and council tax benefits. 
 
Thus for working families: 
• the fraction gaining is largest at the bottom of the income distribution and declines as 
we move up the distribution 
• among families that gain from the NMW, those towards the bottom of the distribution 
gain a smaller absolute cash amount than those families with higher incomes, 
although that lower cash figure may correspond to a higher percentage of the family 
income 
 
The tax system supplements family income for lower paid workers via tax credits, a form 
of negative income tax.  The working tax credit (WTC) is available to all families with 
children in which one adult works at least 16 hours a week.  There is a premium for those 
who work at least 30 hours a week.  In addition, the child tax credit (CTC) is payable to 
those with children.  It consists of a family element (paid to all those with at least one 
child and a premium given to those with a child under one year old) and a child element, 
paid for each child.  Additional payments are also available for approved child care costs.  
The WTC is also available to those without children provided they are over 25 years old 
and work at least 30 hours a week (see Tsotros 2006 for details). 
 
The WTC and CTC thus provide a minimum weekly income guarantee.  Consider single 
earner families in tax year 2006-07 paid the 2006-07 NMW (£5.35): 
 
 
Family type 
Minimum 
weekly income 
guarantee £ 
Effective net 
hourly 
minimum 
wage £ 
 
Family, one child, full time work (35 hours) 
Family, one child, part-time work (16 hours) 
Single person, no children, aged 25+ (35 hours) 
Couple, no children, aged 25+ (35 hours) 
 
268 
210 
175 
206 
 
7.66 
13.12 
5.00 
5.89 
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These tax credits therefore strengthen the incentive to work for those lower paid families 
who otherwise may have been better off remaining on benefits.  The NMW provides a 
vital underpinning to this system because, without the NMW, the cost to the Exchequer 
would be that much higher with the Treasury providing an open-ended subsidy to low 
wage employers.  A 30p increase in the NMW nets the Treasury some £350m, of which a 
quarter flows through lower WTC and CTC payments. 
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Table A.1 
Households gaining from the NMW across the income distribution 
 
 All households Working age households with at 
least one member in employment 
Household 
income 
decile 
% gaining 
from 2003 
uprating 
% gaining 
from 2003 
uprating 
cash gain for 
gainers of 
notional 25p in 
NMW in  
April 2007 
£ 
1 2 3 4 
 
Poorest 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Richest 
 
  
 6 
 7 
 10 
 11 
 11 
 12 
 9 
 8 
 5 
 3 
  
 24 
 25 
 19 
 16 
 13 
 11 
 9 
 7 
 4 
 4 
  
 2.50 
 3.00 
 3.50 
 4.00 
 4.50 
 5.50 
 5.00 
 5.00 
 5.50 
 5.50 
All 9 13  4.50 
    
 
Notes and sources 
 
1. Columns 2 and 3 refer to 2003 uprating. Calculations by Institute for Fiscal Studies using 
Family Resources Survey. Alterations in income resulting from offsetting benefit reductions 
and/or tax increases are taken into account. Source: LPC (2003 p.198). 
 
2. Column 4 is the average cash gain (rounded to nearest 50p), for families that do gain, from a 
notional 25p increase in NMW in April 2007 (i.e. from £5.35 to a notional £5.60). Alterations 
in income resulting from offsetting benefit reductions and/or increases are taken into account. 
Source: HM Treasury (2006b). 
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Table A.2 
 Minimum wage rates 
 
 Age 16 - 17 Age 18 – 21  
(Youth 
Development Rate) 
Age 22 and over 
 NMW Change
(%) 
NMW Change
(%) 
NMW Change
(%) 
Apr 1999 – May 2000   £3.00  £3.60  
June 2000 – Sept 2000   £3.20  6.7 £3.60  0.0 
Oct 2000 – Sept 2001   £3.20  0.0 £3.70  2.8 
Oct 2001 – Sept 2002   £3.50  9.4 £4.10  10.8 
Oct 2002 – Sept 2003   £3.60  2.9 £4.20  2.4 
Oct 2003 – Sept 2004   £3.80  5.6 £4.50  7.1 
Oct 2004 – Sept 2005 £3.00  £4.10  7.9 £4.85  7.8 
Oct 2005 – Sept 2006 £3.00  0.0 £4.25  3.7 £5.05  4.1 
Oct 2006 – Sept 2007 £3.30  10.0 £4.45  4.7 £5.35  5.9 
Oct 2007 – Sept 2008 £3.40  3.0 £4.60  3.3 £5.52  3.2 
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